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ABSTRACT
As a result of the worldwide economic downturn stemming from
events over the past fifteen years, there has been an emphasis on the
need to reform modern corporate governance norms in order to
restore public faith in corporate America. The public has openly
criticized the upper echelon of corporate management for its failure
to prevent the recent crises, continued prosperity, and perceived
capitalization on the losses of other corporate constituents. In
particular, boards of directors of large corporations have increasingly
been subject to scrutiny. This Note addresses the insularity of boards
of directors for publicly held corporations and argues that the
existing ideological frameworks are polarizing and preclude the
possibility of reaching a solution. It then proposes a reform to the
election process and reconceptualization of shareholder voting
rights.
American corporate governance laws and regulations require every
corporation to have a board of directors to serve as an intermediary
between the owners and managers of the corporation. The problem
with executive boards is that they are self-perpetuating, and
shareholders are generally without recourse even if it is clear that a
board has mismanaged a corporation. Consequently, reforms seeking
to eradicate the pervasiveness of corporate managers’ personal
preferences from corporate decisions have similarly sought to
prevent corporate managers’ social connections from influencing
corporate appointments. Nevertheless, an elite network of corporate
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Wisconsin-Madison, 2012. I would like to thank Professor Caroline Gentile for her
counsel and advice with this Note and all of my friends for their tremendous support
and encouragement. I also would like to thank the editorial board and staff of Volume
XX for all of their hard work and support.
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officers remains influential over the process of identifying and
selecting directors.
This Note is concerned with the insularity of boards of directors of
publicly held corporations because of the inherent consequences of
the combination of board entrenchment and unconstrained board
activity. Specifically, it addresses how board insularity compromises
the objectivity of directors and ultimately precludes the board from
faithfully working toward the ultimate goal of shareholder wealth
maximization. Ultimately, this Note offers a way to mitigate an
incumbent board’s dominion over the corporation through reform of
the processes of director selection and election. It explains that a
national standard is necessary to preserve the integrity of the
institution of corporate boards in light of the ever-increasing
responsibilities imposed on them. Furthermore, the proposed
solution was reached with consideration of the need to balance the
establishment of protective measures to monitor directorial action
with the board’s need for autonomy from individual managers’,
shareholders’, and governmental interests. A compromise among
these competing interests can be reached by reforming the process
by which directors are selected to ensure their competency rather
than through interference with the way in which an assumedly
competent board carries out its duties. This Note concludes by
arguing that the existing ideological frameworks, which articulate
the primary purpose of the board, are polarizing and preclude the
possibility of reaching a solution to counterbalance the currently
unrestrained insularity of corporate boards.
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INTRODUCTION
“If you want to be on [corporate] boards, you have to fish where the
fish are.”1 Selected by Fortune as one of the “50 Most Powerful Women
in Business” for five consecutive years, Maggie Wilderotter emphasizes
the importance of networking to obtain a position on a board.2 In the last
twenty-eight years, Wilderotter served as a director on the boards of
twenty-three publicly held corporations.3 In 2004 Wilderotter was both
1. Maggie Wilderotter, How to Get on a Board, BUS. WK. (Apr. 11, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-11/how-to-get-on-a-board-by-frontiercommunications-ceo-maggie-wilderotter.
2. See Juno Appoints Maggie Wilderotter to Board of Directors, PRNEWSWIRE
(Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/juno-appoints-maggiewilderotter-to-board-of-directors-300000682.html; Fortune’s 50 Most Powerful Women
in business, FORTUNE (Oct. 10, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/10/10/
fortunes-50-most-powerful-women-in-business/.
3. Wilderotter, supra note 1.
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appointed to the board of directors of Frontier Communications
Corporation and hired as its Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”). 4
Subsequently, Wilderotter attributed landing her current job as well as
her appointment to various boards to successful networking.5
As a result of the worldwide economic downturn stemming from
events over the past fifteen years, there has been an emphasis on the
need to reform modern corporate governance norms in order to restore
public faith in corporate America.6 In particular, the public has openly
criticized the upper echelon of corporate management for its failure to
prevent the recent crises, its continued prosperity, and its perceived

4. Currently, Wilderotter is a director at Frontier Communications Corp., Proctor
& Gamble Co., and Xerox Corp. as well as at many other non-profit corporations. See
Maggie Wilderotter, WALL ST. J., http://topics.wsj.com/person/W/maggie-wilderotter/
946 (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). Most recently, Wilderotter was appointed to the board
of directors of Juno Therapeutics, which became a publicly held corporation less than
one month after her appointment as director following completion of its initial public
offer on December 19, 2014. See Juno, supra note 2; JUNO THERAPEUTICS, INC.,
NASDAQ.COM, http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/company/juno-therapeutics-inc923186-76993 (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
5. See Wilderotter, supra note 1 (“I’d already served on a board with many of the
directors who recruited me to be a CEO.”); see also Mary Wilderotter, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/profile/mary-wilderotter/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
6. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of
One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 953-54 (2003); Michael K. Molitor, The
Crucial Role of the Nominating Committee: Re-Inventing Nominating Committees in
the Aftermath of Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 97, 99
(2010) (“But the owners periodically become restless and angry, and calls for greater
shareholder involvement in corporate governance have been increasingly insistent
following Enron and the other scandals of the early 2000s and the 2008-2009 financial
crisis.”); see also Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States Corporate Governance
in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 279-83 (2010) (describing
the federal government’s response first to the 2001 Enron and WorldCom scandals,
which precipitated the promulgation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and second to
the 2008 crisis of large financial institutions, which not only precipitated increased
federal government involvement in corporate governance of publicly held corporations,
but also “limit[ed] the role of the states in corporate governance”); Zachary A.
Goldfarb, SEC to Examine Boards’ Role in Financial Crisis, WASH. POST (Feb. 20,
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/19/AR2009021
903172.html. See also infra Part I.C.2.b.ii, for a discussion of the federal government’s
attempts to increase transparency and enhance accountability of corporate boards.
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capitalization on the losses of other corporate constituents. 7
Consequently, reforms seeking to eradicate the pervasiveness of
corporate managers’ personal preferences from corporate decisions have
similarly sought to prevent corporate managers’ social connections from
influencing corporate appointments.8
Wilderotter would not have had such a successful career if she were
not effective at doing her job; however, her story corroborates
suspicions that an elite network of corporate officers remains influential
over the process of identifying and selecting directors. 9 Wilderotter’s
experience also confirms that the new regulations imposed on boards of
directors of publicly held corporations have not significantly changed
the ways in which corporations select people to serve on their boards.10
7. Chandler & Strine, supra note 6, at 953-54 (“Propelled by genuine outrage at
abuses within companies like Enron . . . and by fear of being held accountable for
previous inaction, the federal government . . . and the nation’s two largest Stock
Exchanges . . . have adopted important new initiatives designed to improve the integrity
of corporate America[.]”) (footnotes omitted).
8. See Eric M. Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 49
(2007) (likening nominating committees to “membership committees of private clubs”
and director recruitment to a superficial contest whereby companies “compete for ‘Alist’ board members much like academy award parties vie for ‘A-list’ celebrities”); see
also Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business
Judgment Rule: Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 1, 18 (2010) (explaining that some commentators perceive the incumbent corporate
boards’ control over annual director elections “as a defect in the democratic process of
electing boards of directors[,]” and that they advocate for “more effective oversight of
directors by shareholders . . . to improve corporate performance and prevent the kinds
of scandals and economic crises that rocked the American economy during the past
decade”).
9. In April 2014, Wilderotter spoke at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School
of Management’s “Brave Leader Series” with her sister, Denise Morrison, who happens
to be the President and CEO of Campbell Soup Company. During their appearance, the
sisters expounded on the importance of networking, with Wilderotter agreeing that
“networking is working” and explaining that as one of her strengths it has “opened up
opportunities and different jobs that [she] had.” Sister CEOs, KELLOGG NEWS (Apr. 15,
2014), http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/news_articles/2014/04152014-morrisonwilderotter-brave-leader.aspx (containing a link to a video of the sisters’ commentary
on the importance of networking); see infra Part I.A.1.a.
10. See Jena McGregor & Brigid Schulte, Women still hold only 19 percent of U.S.
board seats. What could change that?, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-leadership/wp/2015/01/13/women-still-holdonly-19-percent-of-u-s-corporate-board-seats-what-could-change-that/ (noting how
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This Note is about the insularity of boards of directors of publicly
held corporations. 11 It addresses the inherent consequences of the
combination of board entrenchment and unconstrained board activity,12
and it offers a way to mitigate an incumbent board’s dominion over the
corporation through reform of the processes of director selection and
election. 13 Finally, this Note argues that the existing ideological
frameworks, which articulate the primary purpose of the board, are
polarizing and preclude the possibility of reaching a solution to
counterbalance the currently unrestrained insularity of corporate
boards.14

organizations like WomenCorporateDirectors and Catalyst recognize the importance of
networking in securing board appointments and quoting Susan Stautberg, co-founder of
WomenCorporateDirectors, when she explained the important service provided by a
membership directory of qualified businesswomen “to help introduce women to ‘guys
who may have only known people at their golf club or on the Business Roundtable.
Women get handicapped because they haven’t always been part of those networks”);
PR NEWSWIRE, Want to Land the Corner Office?, SYS.CON MEDIA (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.sys-con.com/node/3160497 (“The strength of your network could make or
break your search, since most leadership hires result from referrals and connections, not
postings or applications.). But see Dorie Clark, How to Become a Corporate Board
Member, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorieclark/2012/08/13/
how-to-become-a-corporate-board-member/ (explaining that corporate boards no longer
look to their social network to fill director positions because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 imposed “very clear regulations for independent directors in terms of the
credentials necessary to be a financial expert or compensation expert[,]” and boards
now look to professional search firms to find new directors who “demonstrate proof in
past experiences, degrees, focus, and the skill sets board members bring”) (quoting
Elaine Eisenman, Dean of Executive Education at Babson College); see infra Part
I.C.2.b.ii.
11. This Note discusses boards of directors of publicly held corporations as
opposed to boards of directors of closely held corporations.
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. See infra Part II.B (introducing a reform to regulate the election process of
directors and to re-conceptualize shareholder rights).
14. Pinto, supra note 6, at 264 (explaining how a system of corporate governance
monitors “the allocation of power and internal mechanisms designed to protect
shareholders without undermining those who need to manage the corporation”); see
infra Part III.
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A. A BOARD HAS LEGAL CONTROL OF THE CORPORATION
From the outset, the corporate board operates as an intermediary
between the ownership and management of the company, relegating
shareholders to the role of passive investors. 15 Specifically, every
publicly held corporation has a board of directors that has legal control
over the corporation. 16 Similarly, every publicly held corporation has
common stock that members of the public may purchase to become
shareholders.17 This separation of ownership and control is a defining
characteristic of the corporation.18
15. See ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 120 (Macmillan Co. 1932); see In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73
A.3d 17, 38 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Directors must exercise their independent fiduciary
judgment; they need not cater to stockholder whim.”); see generally Pinto, supra note
6, at 259-60 (explaining that although “[o]wnership usually implies control, . . . without
a concentration of ownership in shares, managers who control corporate assets,
information, and the voting mechanisms are in de facto control of the corporation with
little oversight by the owners, i.e., the shareholders.” And thus, “[s]hareholders of many
publicly controlled corporations are passive”); Carol R. Goforth, “A Corporation has
no Soul”—Modern Corporations, Corporate Governance, and Involvement in the
Political Process, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 617, 629 (2010) (identifying their primary power
as “vot[ing] with their feet’ by selling their shares and buying into another business
venture[,]” which they may do “if they do not like how ‘their’ corporation is being
managed”) (footnote omitted). But see Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder
Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2071, 2083 (2010) (calling into question the characterization of shareholders as
“owners” of the corporation).
16. Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837, 850 n.36 (Del.
Ch. 2004) (“[C]orporate power, as a default matter, is exercised through the board.”);
e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.05 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) [hereinafter
Increasing Shareholder Power] (“A central and well-settled principle of U.S. corporate
law is that all major corporate decisions must be initiated by the board.”).
17. See Molitor, supra note 6, at 99 (explaining that although “[s]hareholders
‘own’ the corporation, . . . the board of directors has nearly absolute control over it”).
18. A basic attribute of a corporation is its separate legal existence from its owner.
Specifically, the owners of shares of a corporation generally are not personally liable
for the acts or debts of the corporation. This separation distinguishes the corporation
from other business associations that do not exist as separate legal entities such as
partnerships or limited liability companies. For example, the owners of a partnership
are subject to unlimited personal liability for the obligations of the partnership. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1074 (2014); see generally David McBride,
General Corporation Laws: History and Economics, 74-WTR LAW & CONTEMP.
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While the applicable state corporate code that governs a
corporation will vary by the place of incorporation, all states require
investors to relinquish control to a board of directors upon
incorporation.19 Although recent federal regulations seeking to increase
transparency and accountability of publicly held corporations have
targeted boards of directors, 20 the majority of corporate legal issues
remain covered by state law.21
Importantly, to form a company, state laws require the
incorporating investors to elect a board of directors.22 Investors stipulate
their expectations of the board in the charter of incorporation, and state
laws typically afford investors broad discretion to define the role of the
board.23 Thus, in addition to the applicable state law, a board operates in
PROBS. 1, 4-5 (2011) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of the separation of
ownership and control and the purpose of a corporation as a legal entity that
“facilitate[s] collective action by individuals”).
19. E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b); see also Pinto, supra note 6, at 262
(“The corporate law of the state of incorporation will usually apply to the internal
affairs of those corporations which deal with allocation of power within the company
how the company is managed and controlled.”).
20. See infra Part I.C.2.b.ii for a discussion of new regulations that emerged during
the 2000s following the 2002 corporate scandals and 2008 financial crisis.
21. Pinto, supra note 6, at 262 n.27 (“The internal affairs are usually viewed as the
law which governs the intra-corporate relationships involving the corporations and its
officers, directors, and shareholders. Thus issues of formation, voting, fiduciary duty,
structural changes, and internal corporate power and structures have traditionally been
state law issues.”) (citation omitted).
22. Although corporate laws vary by state, all require the shareholders of a publicly
held corporation to elect a board of directors upon incorporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 108 (2014) (requiring the directors to be named either in the charter or at
an organization meeting).
23. For example, many corporations contain a bylaw “precluding director
nominations by shareholders unless preceded by a notice given to the corporation by a
certain time before the shareholder meeting[.]” Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director
Nominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117, 136 (2014). Additionally, state business codes
generally contain default rules, most of which are flexible because states want
businesses to incorporate there. See, e.g., Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe
Co., 883 A.2d 837, 853 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding for the Jones Apparel Group because
it had properly adopted a default rule set out under Section 213(b) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law (“DGCL”)); Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders,
Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware General Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L.
845, 847 (2008) (explaining that “much of the DGCL creates statutory rules that are
merely ‘defaults[]’ [that] apply only so long as the parties to the corporation choose not
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accordance with its corporation’s incorporating charter and bylaws. 24
After incorporation, however, any changes to a board’s duties are
subject to formal procedural requirements.25
B. A BOARD’S EVERY ACTION MUST PROMOTE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
MAXIMIZATION
Although a corporate board has numerous responsibilities, 26 it is
important to consider the duties of the board in light of its primary
purpose—to manage the corporation in a way that maximizes the value
of the shareholders’ common stock.27

to deviate from them”); see also William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663, 664 (1974) (discussing the advent of
modern liberal corporation statutes and the origin of the race as acknowledged in
Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 562-63 (1933)). But see
Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 1325, 1369 (2013) (rejecting the explanation that states shape their corporate
statutes to entice companies to incorporate there as part of a “race”); Mark J. Roe,
Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 635-39 (2003).
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141; Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election
Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW
67, 72 (2003) (identifying “the corporation’s charter and bylaws and by the corporate
statutory law of the corporation’s jurisdiction of incorporation” as resources from which
to glean the parameters of a company’s shareholders’ rights).
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 103 (explaining the process to amend an
instrument of the corporation, e.g., bylaws of the corporation), § 141(a) (“If any such
provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to
such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of
incorporation.”).
26. Section 141 of the DGCL imposes on corporate boards the duty to manage or
direct the business and affairs of their respective corporations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(a). Although state law does not articulate specific responsibilities the board must
carry out to manage the corporation, modern corporate boards are generally expected to
“approv[e] strategic plans, financial policies, and material transactions,” and to
“monitor[] management performance.” Michael E. Murphy, The Nominating Process
for Corporate Boards of Directors: A Decision-making Analysis, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
131, 151 (2008).
27. See Thompson v. Walker, 234 N.W. 144, 147 (Mich. 1931) (“It is the essence
of this trust [that directors occupy in relation to stockholders] that it shall be so
managed as to produce to each stockholder the best possible return for his
investment.”); Wojcik v. McNish, No. 267005, 2006 WL 2061499, at *5 (Mich. Ct.
App. July 25, 2006) (finding that “a shareholder [undoubtedly] has an interest in having
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In contemplating the board’s purpose, the duties of a board can be
analogized to the duties of a trustee.28 Together, the directors serve as
the trustee of the corporation’s shares.29 The fiduciary relationship that a
board assumes upon the transfer of control from the shareholders defines
the standard by which a board must fulfill its statutory obligation to
manage or direct a corporation’s business and affairs for the benefit of
its shareholders. 30 Specifically, the transfer of control over the
his investment become as profitable as possible”); Molitor, supra note 6, at 101
(explaining the traditional view “that the corporation should be operated primarily to
maximize the wealth of its common shareholders”); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom
Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1932)
(“Historically, and as a matter of law, corporate managements have been required to run
their affairs in the interests of their security holders.”).
28. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “trust” as “a property interest held by one
person (the trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party
(the beneficiary).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); cf. In re Trados Inc.
S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 42 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“As long as a board complies with
its legal obligations, the standard of fiduciary conduct calls for the board to maximize
the value of the corporation for the benefit of the common stock.”) (emphasis added);
LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 452 (Del. Ch. 2010) (rejecting
an enterprise value standard because “it is the duty of directors to pursue the best
interests of the corporation and its common stockholders”); Berle, supra note 27, at
1367 (noting that “corporate managements are trustees for corporate security holders”).
29. It is important to note that as a corporation has a separate legal existence from
its shareholders, a board of directors has a distinct legal existence from its directors.
Duties and rights of the board are accomplished under the guidance and instruction of
the directors, but no director on his or her own may derive from his or her directorial
appointment individual power or outright personal control over the corporation. See
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 206
(8th ed. 2000) (clarifying that “[a] single director . . . has no power[,] [and] [i]nstead,
directors can act only as a body”); Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the
Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 544 (2003) (“Directors act collectively, and they
have generally been held to lack the authority to act for the issuer in their individual
capacities.”). Ultimately, directors are constrained by their joint decision-making ability
within the scope of their roles on the board. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2)
(describing how the corporate charters that authorize the board’s power might similarly
grant a board committee discretion to exercise some board authority without having to
comply with subsection (b), which requires approval from the majority of a quorum for
the transaction of business).
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); see, e.g., In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 36
(explaining that when directors exercise their statutory duty under Delaware corporate
law, “the standard of conduct requires that directors seek ‘to promote the value of the
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corporation’s management imposes upon a board the non-delegable duty
of loyalty to manage the corporation to safeguard the shareholders’
investments. 31 Thus, the fiduciary duty that a board owes its
shareholders guides directorial conduct.32
Although boards’ particular duties vary by corporation, as a general
principle, boards must function in pursuit of shareholder gain through
corporate profit.33 This distinction between overall shareholder wealth
maximization and shareholder profit is key, because it is possible for the
corporation to profit at the expense of the shareholders.34 Specifically, in
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders’“) (quoting eBay Domestic Holdings v.
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010)); In re Advance Nanotech, Inc., No. 13-51215
(MFW), 2014 WL 1320145, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2014) (noting that “normally
a corporation does not owe fiduciary duties to its shareholders, rather, officers and
directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation”); see generally Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989)
(describing the fiduciary rules that govern directorial duties).
31. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc., v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 191 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(“The duty of loyalty, in essence, ‘mandates that the best interest of the corporation and
its shareholders take precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or
controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally.’”) (quoting Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Ind., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). But see Hayden & Bodie,
supra note 15, at 2114 (explaining that more than half of state corporate codes contain
provisions permitting directors to consider the interests of “all corporate constituencies .
. . when making certain decisions”) (emphasis added).
32. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 37 (“In terms of the standard of conduct, the duty of
loyalty therefore mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the
long-term for the benefit of the providers of equity capital, as warranted for an entity
with perpetual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their investment.”).
33. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to
be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end[.]”). See also Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (holding that
when threatened with a takeover, the board is allowed to act in consideration of
“various corporate constituencies”, rather than solely for the stockholders’ benefit). The
Revlon exception nevertheless requires that board actions seek to maximize overall
shareholder wealth. Id. at 176. See infra Part I.C.2.b.i.
34. Directors may act in ways that favor maximizing long-term profits, even if it
produces less optimal short-term results. The underlying principal is to benefit
shareholders, provided their goals remain within legal bounds. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at
36-37 (explaining that the extent that courts acknowledge that directors have a duty to
their corporations to act “for the ultimate benefit of the entity’s residual claimants” is
limited by the fact that “‘stockholders best interest(s) must always, within legal limits,
be the end” and “[o]ther constituencies may be considered only instrumentally to
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managing the corporation, a board need not consider the wishes of each
shareholder.35 Instead, it must strive to increase the value of the common
stock.36
While the legal existence of a corporation is perpetual, the
investment of a shareholder is at the very least limited to the investor’s
lifespan.37 Thus, a board cannot tailor its management of the corporation
to suit each shareholder’s individual aims. 38 Therefore, the corporate
board can be conceptualized as a trustee of the corporation’s shares, and
a shareholder can be viewed as an owner of an alienable interest in the
corporation’s common stock.39
advance that end”); see also infra Part I.C.1. Directors become fiduciaries of the
corporation once they are elected and must serve the best interests of all “and not
merely the interests of those who elect them.” Pinto, supra note 6, at 265. Compare id.
(explaining that since the board is not legally the agent of the shareholders, it may act
regardless of whether the majority of shareholders disapprove), with Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,
293 (1999) (arguing that the “directors owe their fiduciary duties primarily to the
corporation itself” and not the shareholders) (emphasis added).
35. See infra Part I.C.1. Further, a board does not need to consider non-shareholder
interests. This distinction is also intrinsic to distinguishing shareholder primacy from
shareholder wealth maximization because when investors purchase stock in a publicly
held corporation, they become passive investors and relinquish their right to directly
control the operation of the company. See Goforth, supra note 15, at 629; see also infra
Part III.
36. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (“[E]nhancing the
corporation’s long term share value” is a “distinctively corporate concern[.]”).
37. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(5), 122(1) (2014); see also Lipton &
Rosenblum, supra note 24, at 68 (“[shareholders] are not a single monolithic body. Far
from the single owner of a building, the shareholders are a diverse and ever-shifting
group of people and institutions, with differing interests and, in the case of institutional
investors, differing obligations to their own diverse constituencies.”).
38. See Molitor, supra note 6, at 157-58 (explaining that while many shareholders
might have long-term interests, others might be spectators—solely interested in
“increasing the company’s stock price in the short-term”; institutional investors—like a
social-interest group that owns shares and maintains “interests that actually conflict
with the interests of most other shareholders; or investors of competitors—maintaining
“an economic interest in the company’s failure”); see also infra Part I.C.1.
39. See Ralph H. Delforge, Corporations—Non-Delegable Powers of Board of
Directors, 34 MARQ. L. REV. 48, 49-50 (1950) (“Perhaps a satisfactory conclusion is
that the board exercises its powers in a fiduciary capacity, for the benefit of
stockholders, and by analogy, the general rule against a trustee delegating his authority
may be applied.”) (footnotes omitted); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual
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C. A BOARD IS NOT SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE MONITORING AT ANY LEVEL
Confidence in the ability of corporate boards to effectuate their
primary purpose is complicated by the fact that boards are insular. 40
Specifically, while it is the board that has legal control over the
corporation, its directors remain largely insulated from any external
interference in wielding the board’s legal powers.41
There are two characteristics of boards that typically increase their
insularity.42 First, boards are insular because they are self-perpetuating.43
Second, boards are insular because their directors are generally under no
threat of incurring personal liability. 44 Ultimately, board insularity
makes it impossible to ensure that directors will act in the objective best
interests of the shareholders not only because directors’ interests will
diverge, but also because there is insufficient recourse for shareholders
to take against these actors.45
This Note will argue that the process by which directors are elected
must change to mitigate the consequences of board insularity, which
compromises the objectivity of directors and ultimately precludes the
board from faithfully working toward the goal of shareholder wealth
Corporation, 80 G. WASH. L. REV. 764, 768 (2012) (arguing that scholars incorrectly
disregard the attribute of a corporation’s perpetual existence, which is one of the four
defining features of the corporate entity: (1) limited liability, (2) centralized
management, (3) alienable shares, and (4) perpetual existence).
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. Goforth, supra note 15, at 631-32 (“Shareholders, although theoretically the
‘owners’ of the corporation, do not have the ability to initiate most corporate actions
and cannot substantially interfere with board discretion.”) (footnotes omitted).
42. Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk breaks down the arguments of proponents of
board insularity and ultimately concludes “the evidence favors the view that board
insulation is detrimental, rather than beneficial, to the long-term interest of public
companies and their shareholders” in, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating
Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1677-78 (2013)
[hereinafter Insulating Boards]. In this essay, Bebchuk offers the central claim of
insularity proponents, that having boards insulated from shareholder pressure and
limiting shareholder power for this purpose will serve the interests of long-term
incorporations and their long-term shareholders. Id. at 1638. He explained that, “the
extent to which incumbents are insulated from shareholder pressure depends on the
extent to which they are insulated from the possibility of removal via a hostile
takeover.” Id. at 1652.
43. See infra Part I.A.
44. See infra Part I.C.2.
45. See infra Part I.C.
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maximization.46 Part I will demonstrate how the insularity of boards and
the unavoidable extension of boards’ insularity to their directors erode
any reasonable confidence shareholders might have in their respective
boards’ ability to effectuate their primary purpose. Next, Part II will
propose that a national standard is necessary to preserve the integrity of
the institution of corporate boards in light of the ever-increasing
responsibilities imposed on them. It will suggest that regulating the
process by which people become directors, instead of the way in which
they act once elected, will decrease the manifestation of the subjective
interests of directors that jeopardizes the ability of boards to fulfill their
primary duty. Part III will then argue that prevailing, ideologically
driven viewpoints on the purpose of the corporate board conflict on a
fundamental level, and it will explain how the solutions of proposed
reforms are irreconcilable. Finally, this Note will conclude by
emphasizing the importance of preserving the function of boards to
manage the business of the corporation for shareholder wealth
maximization even when new positive law might make the primary
purpose seem secondary.
I. DIRECTORS BASK IN (THE) LIGHT OF BOARD ENTRENCHMENT AND
AUTONOMY
Part I of this Note demonstrates how under the current system of
corporate governance, board insularity is both unavoidable and without
constraint. It identifies two primary attributes of modern corporate
boards that attest to the prevalence of board insularity and explains how
these factors, which essentially guarantee that directors will be
influenced by their subjective interests, obfuscate boards’ underlying
duty to increase the value of the common stock for shareholder profit.
Part I.A introduces the first attribute: how the incumbent directors’
dominion over directorial elections has transformed the corporate board
into a self-perpetuating entity. Part I.B introduces the second attribute:
46. This Note will analyze board insularity in the context of publicly held
corporations that do not have a controlling shareholder. Where there is a controlling
shareholder, the primary concern is the potential opportunism by the majority of
shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders. Instead, this Note focuses on
the boards of companies that do not have a majority shareholder because the board of
directors is less significant where there is a majority shareholder or a constituency of
shareholders for numerous reasons.
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how the directors’ insularity from personal liability effectively allows
directors to act autonomously. Finally, Part I.C pinpoints the inherent
consequences of board insularity and concludes by identifying the
disadvantages inherent in the existence of boards that are exacerbated by
board entrenchment and autonomy.
A. A BOARD IS A SELF-PERPETUATING INSTITUTION
A characteristic of corporate boards that contributes to their
insularity is the directors’ ability to entrench themselves on boards
despite shareholders’ statutory rights to elect directors to the board and
the federal government’s attempts to ensure shareholders can exercise
these rights.47 Once directors have been elected, it is extremely difficult
for shareholders either to replace or to remove them. 48 The ability of
sitting directors to entrench themselves is largely dependent on their
control over the selection of nominees for election to the board each
year. 49 Similarly, the tendency for legal standards and regulations to
establish a presumption in favor of directors protects directors from the
threat of removal. 50 This is problematic because for as long as the
corporation exists, so too will its board.51 Thus, despite their election as
47. Pinto, supra note 6, at 259 (“Because of the vacuum created by the separation
of ownership from control, management of many large corporations has become selfperpetuating.”).
48. See Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 8, at 18 (“A director has a better chance of
being struck by lightning than losing an election” after explaining that, “shareholders’
power to remove and replace directors has proven quite limited, with most directors
facing a very low probability of being ousted—largely neutralizing the shareholders’
vote as an effective means of ensuring director accountability.”) (quoting former SEC
chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr.) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
49. See infra Part I.A.1; George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team
Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV.
1213, 1271 (2008) (“A principal obstacle to shareholder primacy is that a corporation’s
‘official’ nominees for election to the board are chosen by a committee of incumbent
directors.”); Lee Harris, Corporate Elections and Tactical Settlements, 39 J. CORP. L.
221, 247 (2014) (“[T]he vast majority of elections are uncontested and incumbent
directors are automatically re-elected.”).
50. See infra Part I.A.2.
51. Specifically, once the separation of ownership and control occurs, unless the
corporation dissolves, it will continue to be overseen by its board. See generally Mira
Ganor, Salvaged Directors or Perpetual Thrones?, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 267, 269
(2010) (demonstrating how even after a corporation fails, the board might remain
intact).
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individuals, directors on the same board have a reciprocal interest in
perpetuating their status as directors; 52 when they work together to
achieve that goal, they are not only largely insulated from replacement
and removal, but also essentially guaranteed immunity from liability
since individual director activity is not subject to any meaningful
oversight.53
1. Directors Are Difficult to Replace
Board members control the nomination and selection process of
candidates for director elections. 54 Consequently, incumbents do not
face considerable opposition, and it is difficult for shareholders to
replace directors.55
52. See Murphy, supra note 26, at 169 (“[D]irectors commonly hope not only to
secure re-nomination (a likely event)[,] but [also] to secure other directorial
appointments. They are most likely to realize the benefits of board membership, as a
vehicle for future advancement, by conforming to the behavior favored by other board
members.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan & A.C.
Pritchard, Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple
Board Appointments, 58 J. FIN. 1087, 1089 (2003) (explaining that “directors of large
firms might be attractive as candidates for other boards because of the networking
contacts they represent”); see generally Molitor, supra note 6, at 105 (“Absent a
particular director not wishing to continue serving on the board or some unusual
circumstances, the same board members usually would serve term after term, subject to
limited turnover.”).
53. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (1991) (“As a practical matter boards are selfperpetuating until investors become dissatisfied and a majority decides to redo
everything to a new taste.”); see infra Part I.C.2.
54. See Murphy, supra note 26, at 131 (explaining that shareholders have no
“practical means of nominating their own candidates”); id. at 137 (“Apart from an
occasional contest for control, the shareholders, deprived of access to the proxy
machinery, were presented with a single slate of management-nominated candidates for
approval.”); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of
Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1506 (2006) (explaining that
“the ability of shareholders to affect corporate change is limited”); see also Molitor,
supra note 6, at 104-05 (describing how “the board itself (or perhaps a nominating
committee) [traditionally] nominates candidates, often at the suggestion of the
corporation’s chief executive officer”); see generally Hamermesh, supra note 23, at
134-35 (discussing the broad control directors have over nominating candidates).
55. See Molitor, supra note 6, at 107 (“In the end, management typically selects the
nominees, . . . [and] the shareholders usually are shut out of any meaningful
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In theory, shareholders have electoral rights.56 State laws generally
require corporations to hold annual shareholder meetings where
shareholders vote to elect board members each year. 57 However, no
positive law requires shareholders to participate directly in corporate
affairs. 58 In fact, many shareholders do not actively engage in
monitoring their investments to the extent that they may.59 For instance,
participation in the selection of directors.”) (footnote omitted); William K. Sjostrom Jr.,
The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections and Shareholders’ Meetings,
74 TENN. L. REV. 199, 210 (2007) (“The reality is that the outcome of the vast majority
of director elections is a foregone conclusion-the nominees chosen by management
win.”); see also Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 8, at 18 (“[T]he outcome of almost all
board elections is a foregone conclusion—incumbent directors win.”).
56. Shareholders vote to elect board members each year. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 211(b) (2014); see also Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d
294, 311 n. 39 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[T]he election of directors may be the most . . .
important action [] that shareholders can take.”) (citation omitted); Brett H. McDonnell,
Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy Access, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67, 114 (2011)
(“Shareholder election of directors is a core legitimate and legitimating shareholder
power. This is an area where directors are tempted to set sub-optimal rules that entrench
themselves.”).
57. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216. In North Dakota and Minnesota, annual
shareholder meetings and director elections are optional. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.171 (2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. §302A.431 (2008); see generally Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution
for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1777 (2006) (“The right to
elect directors is an important tool for stockholders, allowing them to hold centralized
management accountable and thereby contributing to the creation of stockholder wealth
by checking agency costs.”).
58. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (providing that “each stockholder shall be
entitled [one] vote for each share of capital stock”) (emphasis added); see Mitchell,
supra note 54, at 1547-48 (“[S]tate corporation statutes and charters govern shareholder
voting [and] determine which issues . . . require shareholder voting as well as the
particular procedures that voting processes should follow. Historically, shareholders
had . . . to vote [at the annual meeting]. But . . . with the rise of the large public
corporation, proxy voting became the norm[.]”). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
brought voting rules under various states’ corporate laws under federal control. 17
C.F.R. § 240.12a–4 (2011) (listing requirements for voting by proxy). Despite the
existence of federal proxy law, the significance of the shareholder vote has deteriorated
to the point of being irrelevant. See Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder
Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative
Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 143 (2009) (“Shareholders’ voting
rights may also be overrated and are considered by some to be largely a fig leaf.”).
59. See infra notes 113-118 and accompanying text, for a discussion of shareholder
involvement in managing the corporation. It is accepted that despite their ownership
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some shareholders vote through proxies, who do not necessarily consult
the shareholders prior to elections. 60 Alternatively, other shareholders
simply abstain from exercising their right to vote.61

interests, shareholders will not play an active role in the decision-making process.
Bernard S. Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful to Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 387, 399 (2012) (“[T]he board is not required to follow the commands of its
shareholders, even if shareholders pass a unanimous resolution requesting the board to
act in a specific manner; shareholders may ratify a board’s action, but the board must
first approve the action[.]”) (footnote omitted). Consequently, “many shareholders pay
little or limited attention to the question of how to vote.” Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth
of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 692 (2007) [hereinafter Shareholder
Franchise]; see also Harris, supra note 49, at 246 (explaining that most shareholders
may be categorized as “passive” because they “have limited ability or desire to affect
the firm’s strategic direction[,] [t]hey may hold their investment for years without ever
even closely reading the firm’s annual reports and proxy statements they receive in the
mail[,] [t]hey never ask to review or inspect the books of the corporation[,] and [they]
are unlikely to have the resources or desire to engage in litigation against the firm”)
(footnotes omitted).
60. See Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 8 IND. L.J. 1299, 1305-06
(2013) (explaining that many shareholders delegate their votes to proxy advisors that
usually vote in a designated manner). In fact, corporations generally have to solicit
shareholder proxies in order to satisfy quorum requirements. Sjostrom, supra note 55,
205 (2007). However, “not all shareholders are informed about the[ir] company[,] and
those who do decide to participate in proxy access may have little information on the
proper choice of director nominees.” Sharfman, supra note 59, at 402. See generally
Robert J. Klein, The Case of Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the Shareholders’
Franchise Right, 44 STAN. L. REV. 129, 177 n.3 (1991) (“The proxy system is the
mechanism by which shareholders exercise their right to vote on issues of corporate
governance, such as the election of members of the board of directors, mergers, or
amendments to the corporation’s bylaws.”); Pinto, supra note 6, at 268-69 (“[S]tate
statutes permit the use of proxies allowing shareholders to vote on certain matters prior
to a meeting or assign their voting right to another person who will be present at the
meeting. The actual voting takes place prior to any meeting[.]”). Contra Sagiv
Edelman, Proxy Advisory Firms: A Guide for Regulatory Reform, 62 EMORY L.J. 1369,
1409 (2013) (finding that “[p]roxy advisory firms serve a very important function in
facilitating the rational, efficient exercise of the shareholder franchise”).
61. Shareholders withholding votes under the traditional scheme would not impact
the results of an election because, “[u]nder the plurality voting rules . . . the contestant
with the highest number of votes wins, regardless of whether the contestant secures a
majority of the votes cast.” Harris, supra note 49, at 223; see infra Part I.A.1.b.
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In practice, elections are widely recognized as meaningless. 62
Although the federal government regulates aspects of board elections for
publicly held corporations, its attempts at preserving shareholder
involvement have largely been futile. 63 Shareholders have little-to-no
influence over director “elections” for two main reasons. 64 First, the
board controls the elections by determining the nominees. 65 Second,
62. Although mandatory under state laws, the effect of the statutes’ corresponding
language is such that failure to hold annual meetings will not affect an otherwise valid
corporation’s actions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 7.01(c) (2005). The practical result of this is what led courts to acknowledge
openly that shareholder voting is an “unimportant formalism.” Blasius Indust., Inc. v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 616-17 (2006)
(“As a formal matter, only the election of directors and amending the bylaws do not
require approval before shareholder action is possible. In practice, of course, even the
election of directors (absent a proxy contest) is predetermined by the existing board
nominating the next year’s board.”) (footnote omitted); Harris, supra note 49, at 222
(describing corporate elections as “fundamentally broken” and explaining that they
“give shareholders little real opportunity to participate meaningfully in deciding who
should serve on the board”); Molitor, supra note 6, at 97 (“For decades, ‘shareholder
activists have criticized the fact that shareholders of public companies have no
meaningful voice in the selection of directors.”); Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 216
(“Characterizing the annual election of directors as a charade is nothing new[.]”).
63. The SEC must approve all exchange listing standards. 15 U.S.C. § 78(s)(b); see
also 17 C.F.R. 240 14a-8(b)(1) (2011); Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 202 (“[F]ederal
proxy rules dictate procedures for the solicitation of proxies.”). However, federal
regulations of proxy solicitation and board composition do not establish any effective
“checks” on board activity. Id. at 216; infra Part I.C.2.e.
64. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1062 (“[T]”he corporation’s
nominal owners—the shareholders—lack both the legal right and, in most cases, the
practical ability to exercise meaningful oversight of the corporation’s management.”).
65. Only one state expressly addresses the process of nominating directors. MD.
CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS, § 2-504(f) (2014) (permitting corporations to adopt
bylaws that require “any stockholder proposing a nominee for election as a director or
any other matter for consideration at a meeting of the stockholders to provide advance
notice of the nomination or proposal to the corporation before a date or within a period
of time specified in the charter or bylaws”). However, the Maryland statute does not
recognize that shareholders have an inherent right to nominate directors. See Sprague &
Lyttle, supra note 8, at 18 (2010); infra Part I.A.1.a; see also Harris, supra note 49, at
223 (“Without the presence of competition, the incumbents are automatically re-elected
to their posts, regardless of how shareholders vote.”); Molitor, supra note 6, at 105 (“If
a director resigned or declined to stand for re-election the board would need to select a
new nominee, but it was the rare board that solicited suggestions from shareholders.”);
Murphy, supra note 26, at 132 (“The shareholders may be equity owners of the
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proxy contests are generally cost-prohibitive and will not necessarily
have the desired effect in the unlikely event that they are successful.66
a. The Incumbent Board Determines the Election “Slate”
Unless a corporation’s charter and bylaws contain specific
provisions governing the election process, incumbent boards need not
consult with shareholders when determining director-nominees. 67
Consequently, the incumbent board has dominion over the composition
of the “slate” of directors on which the shareholders vote.68
Although the incumbent board determines the election slate and
generally need not account for its decisions, the federal government
requires that corporations make certain public disclosures in the form of
corporation, but when they are presented with an unopposed slate of directorial
candidates, without having practical means of nominating their own candidates, it is
clear that management effectively controls the corporate ballot.”); Pinto, supra note 6,
at 269 (pointing out the paradox that although directors need to obtain shareholder votes
in order to be retain their positions, corporate managers are not concerned with their
reelection because they “have control over corporate information and proxy materials
and the cost of their solicitation is at corporate expense”) .
66. See Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 212; infra Part I.A.1.b.
67. See Molitor, supra note 6, at 99 (“[T]he incumbent directors generally select
the nominees, who are then virtually guaranteed of election under plurality voting.”);
infra note 193. Contra Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663 (explaining that while it may be true
“that the board knows better than do the shareholders what is in the corporation’s best
interest[,] . . . it is irrelevant (except insofar as the shareholders wish to be guided by the
board’s recommendation) when the question is who should comprise the board of
directors”).
68. Molitor, supra note 6, at 99 (“Moreover, in publicly traded corporations, nearly
all shareholders have no practical power to nominate board candidates.”); Goforth,
supra note 15, at 633 (“The shareholders have an annual meeting, but public
shareholders rarely do more than approve the slate of directors proposed by existing
management and whatever other management proposals the board has decided to place
before the shareholders.”); see also Global Newswire, BioMarin Announces Planned
Changes to Board of Directors Leadership Structure, CNNMONEY (Jan. 7, 2015, 4:15
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/globenewswire/10114567.htm
(announcing that the chairman of the board had voluntarily stepped down from his
position and was seeking re-election as a director and that the board would voluntarily
revise the organizational structure of the board and company, but including at the end of
the press release that “[a]ll of the planned changes are contingent on the reelection” of
the former Chairman and two former directors pre-selected to fill the new positions
created by the new board structure).
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proxy statements for two main reasons.69 First, the disclosures enable
shareholders—especially those voting by proxy—to make informed
votes.70 Second, the board’s decision-making process is not completely
opaque.71
The Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regulates voting by
proxy by stipulating categorical information that boards must disclose to
their shareholders about the nominees for election to the board; 72
however, the compulsory disclosures are generally inconsequential and
unlikely to be meaningful to an ordinary stockholder. 73 For example,
pursuant to Rule 14a-4, incumbent boards must distribute proxy
materials to shareholders to inform shareholders of the “slate” of
nominees that the boards selected for election prior to elections.74 This
69. See generally Harris, supra note 49, at 228 (dubbing the corporate election “a
heavily regulated affair[,]” describing the proxy statement as detailed and elaborate, and
subsequently insinuating that the requisite disclosures constitute an effective
mechanism by which the corporation informs its shareholders of the election process).
Contra Sharfman, supra note 59, at 409 (explaining that ultimately, “proxy access is an
inefficient tool of accountability”).
70. Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 206 (“The proxy statement is designed to provide
shareholders with relevant information regarding the matters up for vote for which
proxies are solicited.”) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 205-06 (explaining that the SEC issued rules to regulate the solicitation of
proxies “to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate
action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation”) (citation
omitted).
72. See infra Part II.C.2.b.ii.
73. Through § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC regulates the
content of proxy materials. Specifically, the SEC outlines what technical information a
board must include in a proxy statement in Item 7 of Rule 14a-101. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-101 (2011). Pursuant to § 14(a), corporations must disclose biographical
information about each nominees as well as any financial interest a nominee holds in
the corporation. Further, a proxy statement relating to the election of an incumbent
director requires the corporation to disclose whether the director failed to attend 75% of
board and committee meetings or more and the director’s compensation from the past
year in addition to any financial transactions between the director and any other
directors or the corporation. Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 206. There in nothing in §
14(a), however, that requires corporations to include a résumé for each nominee or
anything about a nominee’s qualifications that would demonstrate competence or
establish suitability to serve on the board. Thus, incumbent directors fully control the
process despite Rule 14a-4’s requirement because they not only supply shareholders
with the proxy material, but also interpret the “biographical information” requirement
before distributing the slate.
74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b).
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rule does not have any significant operable effect.75 Consequently, the
candidates are often incumbent directors. 76 Furthermore, although the
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the NASDAQ Stock Market
(“NASDAQ”) now require listed corporations to have a nominating
committee comprised of independent directors, the committees are still
made up of incumbent directors who most likely nominate themselves.77
Finally, in the rare case where a nominee is not an incumbent, unless the
incorporating charter or bylaws expressly provide otherwise, a board
need not justify its choice or confine its search to individuals speciallyqualified or trained to carry out directorial duties.78
75. See e.g., Harris, supra note 49, at 224 (explaining that if incumbent directors
perceive a potential challenge to their re-election, they often employ pre-voting
settlements to “entice challengers to drop their bid in exchange for board seats and cold,
hard cash” effectively excluding the shareholders from the “chance to vote on the
directors’ fate al all”); see infra Part I.A.1.b.
76. See Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 240 n.124 (“[C]ontrol will tend to be in the
hands of those who select the [nominating] committee by whom, in turn, the election of
directors for the ensuing period may be made. Since the [nominating] committee is
appointed by the existing management, the latter can virtually dictate their own
successors. Where ownership is sufficiently sub-divided, the management can thus
become a self-perpetuating body even though its share in the ownership is negligible.”)
(quoting BERLE & MEANS, supra note 15, at 87-88).
77. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Listed Company Manual, § 303A.04 (Amended Nov.
25, 2009 (NYSE-2009-89)), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/
bookmark.asp?id=sx-ruling-nyse-policymanual_303A.04&manual=/lcm/sections/lcmsections/ [hereinafter NYSE Manual]; NASDAQ OMX Grp., Equity Rules, Rule IM5605-6(e) Independent Director Oversight of Director Nominations (Amended Nov. 26,
2013 (SR-NASDAQ-2013-147), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/
NASDAQTools/bookmark.asp?id=nasdaq-rule_5000&manual=/nasdaq/main/nasdaqequityrules/ (requiring a nominee be considered on the suggestion of either a
nomination committee composed wholly of independent directors or a majority vote of
the board’s independent directors). Although the nominating committees might have to
be comprised of independent directors, directors still confer with other members of the
board and officers of the corporation. See also Murphy, supra note 26, at 148 (“[I]t is
clear that CEO’s may have the dominant voice in the nominating process even if not
included in the membership of a nominating committees composed of independent
directors.”); see infra Part I.C.2.ii, for a discussion of the federal government’s
misguided focus on the independence of directors.
78. See Daniele Marchesani, The Concept of Autonomy and the Independent
Director of Public Corporations, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 315, 327 (2005) (“State laws
generally do not provide mandatory director qualifications, and few are the cases in
which corporations fill the gap.”). Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires
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Additionally, boards not only control the size and composition of
the slate of nominees,79 but also “use[] corporate funds, personnel, and
that a board have an audit committee comprised by “independent” directors with at least
one director who has financial or accounting experience, corporations retain
discretionary power to determine the remainder of their boards’ composition, and it is
the incumbent board that usually makes those decisions. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7213). Under the NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements, the nominating
committee is required to identify perspective directors based on their qualifications;
however, neither stock exchange outlines what makes an individual “qualified.” For
example, the NYSE requires a board’s nominating committee have a written charter
that lists its primary responsibility as “identify[ing] individuals qualified to become
board members, consistent with criteria approved by the board[.]” NYSE Manual,
supra note 77, § 303A.04(b)(i) (emphasis added).
79. State laws generally require a minimum of “one natural person.” See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2014) (identifying a “qualified” director as “a natural
person” that meets the requirements for service prescribed by the corporation). Unless
the corporate charter stipulates about the board composition, the board may elect
directors at its discretion. See id. (“Directors need not be stockholders unless so
required by the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws. The certificate of
incorporation or bylaws may prescribe other qualifications for directors.”).
Additionally, depending on a corporation’s incorporating charter or bylaws, a board
may not only expand the board’s size by creating positions for additional directors, but
also it may fill those seats, where the unelected directors will be entrenched by the next
election. See id. at §§ 109(a), 141(b) (providing that the number of directors will be
fixed in either the bylaws or the certificate of incorporation, and if the bylaws fix the
number of directors and the corporation’s certificate of incorporation confers upon the
board the power to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws, the board may alter the number of
directors on the board); id. at § 142(e) (“Any vacancy occurring in any office of the
corporation by death, resignation, removal or otherwise, shall be filled as the bylaws
provide. In the absence of such provision, the vacancy shall be filled by the board of
directors or other governing body.”). See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03 (2005); id. at §
8.10. Although stockholders do not divest their right to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws
in instances where a corporation has conferred equivalent power over the bylaws unto
the board, the board has the ability to orchestrate changes that would have a limiting
effect on shareholders’ ability to exercise power. For example, JDS Uniphase
Corporation (“JDSU”) conferred upon its board the right to adopt bylaws, and in May
2014 the board adopted a bylaw “governing notice provisions for the nomination of
Directors” that many shareholders believed was detrimental to their rights. See the letter
to the board demanding remedy to the bylaw written and released by Thomas Sandell,
CEO of Sandell Asset Management Corp., a shareholder of JDSU, Press Release:
Sandell Releases Letter to the Board of Directors of JDS Uniphase, MARKETWATCH
(Jan. 13, 2015, 9:02AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sandell-releases-letter-tothe-board-of-directors-of-jds-uniphase-2015-01-13; see also Hamermesh, supra note
23, at 132 n. 67, 136, 139, 150 (distinguishing between the “far more intrusive”
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facilities to prepare, print, and distribute proxy materials.”80 The absence
of any general requirement that the corporation’s ballot include space
either for a competing candidate or for “write-ins” underscores the
board’s dominion over the slate.81 Therefore, the nominees generally run
unopposed and win by default.82
b. Proxy Contests Are Futile
In the rare instance that a shareholder launches a proxy contest to
canvass a competing slate, the board’s slate usually prevails.83 Electoral

limitations on the right to nominate, which cannot be eliminated entirely, and advance
notice requirements, which apparently “could restrict shareholder proposals or
nominations by including an advance notice provision in the corporation’s charter or
bylaws” and noting that advance notice bylaws have “become standard in U.S. public
companies” and upheld as valid by courts as long as they do not operate inequitably or
unduly restrict the right to nominate) (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2504(f) (West 2013)).
80. Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 210; see Harris, supra note 49, at 241 (explaining
that an insurgent has to bear the upfront costs for launching the proxy contest including
hiring lawyers to make the requisite disclosures and paying to distribute the proxy
statements to shareholders, “while the incumbent can pay for these expenses out of the
corporate treasury”). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (allowing a corporation to
adopt a provision in its bylaws where subject to certain conditions and procedures, the
corporation may reimburse a shareholder for some expenses incurred in soliciting
proxies) (emphasis added).
81. See Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 211 (“[I]t (is) generally impossible for a
shareholder to use the corporation’s proxy card to instruct the proxy to vote against a
nominee or to vote for someone other than a nominee listed on the card.”); see also
Murphy, supra note 26, at 178 (explaining that “corporations are uniformly
unresponsive to shareholder efforts to intervene in the sphere of decision making, and,
in particular, resist shareholder participation in the nominating process.
Communications between shareholders and the corporation are normally relegated to a
shareholder relations department well removed from the centers of decision making”)
(footnotes omitted).
82. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1069 (“Because directors
generally run unopposed, the shareholder vote is more advisory than anything else.”).
83. See Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 212 (“[P]roxy contests for the election of for
the election of directors outside of the takeover context are extremely rare[.]”); see also
Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1114 (“[I]nstitutional investors occasionally
nominate board members in order to influence governance of the firm.”); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW.
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proxy contests are rare because they are prohibitively expensive. 84
Specifically, elections are costly to run, and independent actors have
very little chance of winning. 85 Although Rule 14a-8(i)(8) under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires “companies (to) permit
shareholder proposals,” the requirements for properly completing a
proposal establish a daunting threshold to meet.86 A shareholder must
first satisfy many procedural and substantive requirements to be eligible
to submit a proposal, and the proposal must conform to another set of
requirements before it can be submitted for consideration.87 Then, the

329, 336 (2010) (“Electoral challenges are in fact quite infrequent.”); Shareholder
Franchise, supra note 59, at 675; Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 8, at 18.
84. See id. (explaining that proxy contests typically cost insurgents between $5 and
$10 million); Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1069-70 (“The only sure way
to remove a director is through a proxy contest, in which a rival pays, win or lose, the
full costs of distributing ballots to shareholders and convincing them to vote for the
rival.”); Molitor, supra note 6, at 106 (“Soliciting proxies is difficult and expensive.
First, one must incur the expense of printing and mailing the proxy statement and
engaging in other solicitation activities. In addition, one must ensure that any proxy
materials comply with the SEC’s detailed proxy rules, which almost certainly will
require the assistance of expensive attorneys. The shareholder would also face potential
liability for any materially false or misleading proxy materials. As a result, only the
largest and most determined shareholders would consider mounting a proxy contest in
favor of their own nominees, at least outside a takeover battle[.]”) (footnotes omitted).
85. See generally Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 16, at 856 (explaining
how the current reimbursement scheme allows management to ignore the wishes of
shareholders yet remain in power).
86. Rule 14a-8 under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 regulates when a
corporation must include a shareholder proposal in its proxy statements and on its proxy
card at shareholder meetings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011) (emphasis added); see
Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 8, at 19-20 (“The effect of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) has been to
prevent shareholder nominations of directors via proxy.”). Contra Sharfman, supra note
59, at 382 (concluding that the amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) “radically reduced the
cost of getting proxy access proposals in front of a public company’s shareholders”
because prior to this change, disgruntled shareholders’ only alternative “to present a
proxy access proposal to other shareholders through the proxy process was to use their
own solicitation materials under SEC Rules 14a-6 and 14a-12, which has historically
been cost prohibitive”) (footnote omitted).
87. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a- 8(i)(8) (providing that a corporation may
exclude a shareholder proposal if the proposal “otherwise could affect the outcome of
the upcoming election of directors”); see Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 207 (“Rule 14a-8a
provides thirteen substantive grounds under which a corporation may exclude a
proposal from its proxy materials.”).
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insurgent must campaign and convince generally passive shareholders to
vote in support of the challenger’s slate.88
Proxy contests are an essential option for shareholders because
unless an insurgent mounts a full campaign, shareholders can only
signal discontent by “withholding” their votes. 89 Under a majorityvoting scheme, a shareholder’s “withhold vote campaign” will
successfully block the proposed slate from passing if it is joined by a
majority of the shareholders; 90 however, even if the shareholders
successfully thwart the management slate, the directors get to pick the
replacement nominee.91
Although a corporation reimburses a successful insurgent, a
corporation also reimburses the incumbent board’s rebuttal to a contest
regardless of the outcome. 92 The financial support for the incumbent

88. See Shareholder Franchise, supra note 59, at 691-92 (“[T]o vote for the rival
team, [shareholders] must be convinced not only that the incumbents’ performance is
sub-par, but also that the rival team would likely perform better. Otherwise,
shareholders might well choose to stay with the devil they know.”).
89. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1094 (explaining that while an
individual who desires to serve on a board can communicate with all of the
shareholders of a company, the publicity and voting costs are prohibitive).
90. The current default voting scheme merely requires a nominee receive a
plurality of the votes. Under the plurality voting scheme, where the election is
uncontested, directors automatically obtain a plurality of the votes and are elected as
long as quorum requirements are met. H. Rodgin Cohen & Glen T. Schleyer,
Shareholder vs. Director Control over Social Policy Matters: Conflicting Trends in
Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 81, 105-06 (2012).
But see Klausner, supra note 23, at 1361 (supporting a majority voting requirement,
which would “require[] directors, when running unopposed, to receive a majority of
votes to be assured of retaining their seats” because it “may increase management
responsiveness to shareholder demands is majority voting, a shareholder voting regime”
and a study “found that the adoption of majority voting was associated with an increase
in share price”).
91. See generally Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 8, at 20 (“At best, shareholders
could force certain directors off of the board, but could not select their replacements.”).
92. Corporate funds finance the board’s campaign against its shareholder. Thus, in
effect, the shareholders’’ money is working against them. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293-300 (N.Y. 1955) (permitting
incumbents’ reimbursement from corporate treasury for expenses incurred in
conducting their proxy solicitation where amounts were “reasonable” and the contest
involved “policy” questions, rather than just “purely a personal power contest”);
Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1070 (“Firms pay incumbents’ costs no
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board covers increased campaign costs, such as additional promotional
materials and potential litigation costs arising from claims the board
might have against the insurgent for any violation of a federal proxy
rule.93 Therefore, the prospect of reimbursement is unlikely to persuade
a disgruntled shareholder to undertake a proxy contest.
2. Directors Are Difficult To Remove
Directors act in the guise of a single entity pursuant to their duties
as the members of the board.94 This makes it particularly difficult for
shareholders to remove a director before the director’s term ends.95
In theory, shareholders have the legal authority to remove
directors.96 Specifically, courts have generally recognized shareholders’
inherent power to remove directors “for cause.” 97 Moreover, some
matter what, and incumbents are effectively spending shareholders’ money to maintain
their jobs.”).
93. Insurgents are reimbursed when they win, but they rarely do. See infra Part
I.C.2, for a discussion of formal obstructions to successful shareholder litigation. See
Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 213; see also Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at
1070 (explaining that “given [their] asymmetry of costs and benefits . . ., proxy contests
are exceedingly rare[.]”).
94. See supra Introduction, Section B; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a
Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3
(2002) [hereinafter Why a Board?] (reporting that a corporate board is as a “collegial
body that functions mainly by consensus”).
95. See Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 8, at 18 (“In practice, the shareholders’ power
to remove . . . directors has proven quite limited, with most directors facing a very low
probability of being ousted[.]”); Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 16, at 856
(“[S]hareholders’ existing power to remove directors is not generally sufficient to
ensure that management will initiate all changes in governance arrangements that
shareholders view as value-increasing.”).
96. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2010); Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d
603, 609 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding it “clear that the directors of Delaware corporations
in general . . . have no vested right to hold office in defiance of a properly expressed
will of the majority”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del.
1985) (“If the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected
representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the
board out.”) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
97. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k). State corporate laws are generally silent
on “cause,” which is subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134
A.2d 852, 860-61 (Del. Ch. 1957) (holding that, if proven, charges of having a “planned
scheme of harassment” and action “deliberately obstructive” to the corporate business
constitute “cause” for a director’s removal).
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statutes permit shareholders to vote to remove directors “without
cause.” 98 Notably, there are usually provisions adopted in the
incorporating charters to negate this default.99
In practice, director removal occurs infrequently.100 Once elected,
directors become entrenched in their positions.101 Board decisions and
communication with shareholders are not attributed to individual
directors because decisions regarding corporate operations come from
the board, not the individual directors, as does the power to direct
“board operations.” 102 Furthermore, the procedural requirements and
98. Insituform of N. Am., Inc. v. Chandler, 534 A.2d 257, 267 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(holding “that when shareholders have the power to remove a director without cause,
their subjective motivation in exercising that power is irrelevant”).
99. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (allowing corporations to stipulate in their
charters of incorporation whether directors must only be removed “for cause”); see,
e.g., Essential Enters. Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 159 A.2d 288 (Del. Ch.
1960) (demonstrating that where investors have not adopted a provision in the
incorporating charter that directors may be removed “without cause,” it will be
extremely difficult, if at all possible, for the corporation’s policy to be amended through
bylaws); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08(a) (2005).
100. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45
VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1304 (1992) [hereinafter A Critical Look] (“Director removal is in
fact rarely litigated.”); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting
for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 473 (2007) (“Shareholders do have
the power to remove directors, but such power is extremely impractical to exercise in
the public company context.”) (footnote omitted); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits
of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 789 (2007) (agreeing that shareholders in
publicly held corporations generally lack the power to remove directors); see also
Klein, supra note 60, at 140 (listing existing defenses available to incumbent directors
to shield themselves from a potential proxy challenge including “creating advance
notice requirements for shareholder nominations to the board, and eliminating the right
of shareholders to remove directors without cause or to change the size of the board”).
101. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1752 (2006) [hereinafter Director
Primacy] (“[S]uch [removal] measures necessarily require the support of other
shareholders, which makes displacing inefficient but entrenched managers a costly
undertaking.”); cf. Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 825-30, 833 (2013) (discussing the enhanced impact of shareholder
involvement on board elections and their subsequent increased ability to “unseat
directors”). But see Part I.C.2.b.
102. Board operations are for many practical purposes necessarily confidential. See
Fisch & Gentile, supra note 29. (“Directors act collectively, and they have generally
been held to lack the authority to act for the issuer in their individual capacities.”); see
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practical effect of initiating a proceeding to remove a director are
burdensome to both the complaining shareholder and the corporation.103
In addition to the SEC’s regulation of insurgent action, the
provisions in a corporation’s incorporating charter and bylaws govern
campaigns to remove directors both for cause and without cause. 104
Nevertheless, whether cause exists for a director’s removal is subject to
judicial review,105 and the standard of review applied by judges is highly
deferential. 106 Further, shareholders do not have access to all of the
internal proceedings and deliberations of a board, and they are unlikely
to be able to identify a single actor responsible for independently
causing a single result.107 Ultimately, removal of directors of publicly
held corporations is rare. 108 And thus, the combination of boards’
also infra Part II.A (explaining why insularity is necessary. Thus, if a shareholder were
able to single out a director for removal, then this principle would be undermined).
103. The SEC imposes strict requirements and restrictions limiting insurgents under
Rule 14a-8, which narrowly interpreted the decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps.
Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (holding that the company justifiably
excluded a shareholder proposal from proxy materials where the proposal was illegal
because, if adopted, the proposal would cause the board to abdicate its fiduciary duties
to manage the company).
104. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k).
105. See Campbell v. Loews, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 861-62 (Del. Ch. 1957) (holding
that accused directors are ensured the opportunity, at the corporation’s expense, to
defend themselves in “statement[s] which must accompany or precede the initial
solicitation of proxies seeking the authority to vote for the removal of such director[s]
for cause”).
106. See infra Part I.C.2.
107. This is significant because then any removal would be board removal, not
specific directors. For example, even decisions made by the audit committee cannot
definitively be attributed to committee members. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 29, at
568-69. Nothing requires the committee to act in isolation, and increased liability for
“special” directors would discourage “qualified” individuals from serving on boards.
See Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance:
Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 489, 492 (1999) (“Because of the strictly confidential and highly
interpretive nature of board activity, it is likely to be extremely difficult for researchers
to measure the task performance of boards in ways that are both reliable and
comprehensive.”).
108. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59
BUS. LAW. 43, 46 (2003) [hereinafter Access to the Ballot] (“In the absence of an
attempt to acquire the company, the prospect of being removed in a proxy contest is far
too remote to provide directors with incentives to serve shareholders.”); Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 806-07 (1983) (explaining that director
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dominion over director elections and the unlikelihood of director
removal has allowed the modern corporate board to become a selfperpetuating entity, insulated from external pressures or interference.109
B. A BOARD IS AUTONOMOUS
Corporate boards also maintain insularity through their de facto
autonomy, despite legal constraints purporting to constrain their power
and role in managing the corporation.110 Boards must be able to function
autonomously in order to manage the corporation properly to maximize
shareholder wealth; 111 however, it is important not to conflate the
board’s need for autonomy with the directors’ desire for personal
autonomy.112
removal—either with or without cause—rarely occurs because of its cumbersome
procedural requirements, which threaten needless disruption of “the centralized
management services that directors are supposed to provide[,]” and “[i]nstead, directors
are usually terminated informally (consent), through a takeover (a market mechanism),
or in the election process (by a proxy fight)”).
109. See Harris, supra note 49, at 223 (“[S]hareholders have no practical method of
ousting underperforming directors.”). See infra Part I.C, for a discussion of how much
discretion courts afford business decisions of boards and how thoroughly directors are
insulated from liability.
110. Top corporate managers are legally and factually autonomous for many
purposes. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 1472 (“[U]nder corporate law, the
shareholders normally cannot make ordinary business decisions, cannot make major
structural decisions unless the directors concur, and cannot remove directors without
cause.”); Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and
Accountability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 44 (2008)
(explaining that “the law vests [elected] directors with almost unlimited authority to
manage the corporation”); see also infra Part I.C.2.
111. See supra Introduction, Section B; see also Sharfman, supra note 59, at 401
(explaining that increasing director oversight in an attempt to reduce the frequency of
errors resulting from irresponsible decisions will not only fail to guarantee enhanced
corporate decision-making, but also risk the destruction of “the genuine values of
authority”).
112. See infra Part II.A (concluding that current protections over-insulate individual
directors, but arguing that increased director liability would not resolve the underlying
issue caused by unconstrained boards). Thus, this Note seeks to balance the
establishment of protective measures to monitor directorial action with the board’s need
for autonomy from individual managers’, shareholders’, and governmental interests.
Contra Blair & Stout, supra note 34, at 253 (arguing that “boards exist not to protect
shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the
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Regardless of their legal rights, 113 shareholders have little-to-no
influence over the operation of the board of directors of a company in
which they invested. 114 In fact, having entrusted the ability to make
decisions to the board upon incorporation, the shareholders’
individualized interests are subsumed into the goal of overall economic
prosperity for the corporation. 115 Hence, the shareholders’ power to
decide both in which state to incorporate and what provisions to adopt in
the corporation’s charter is essential in protecting their interests and
determining the future management of the corporation after they
relinquish control to the board.116 Indeed, federal regulations and judicial
practice effectively safeguard the board’s status as an autonomous
entity.117 And thus, legal standards and longstanding practices that are
members of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file
employees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors.”) (emphasis added).
113. Shareholder involvement in the oversight of the corporation is limited to being
able to vote on (1) the election of directors; (2) amendments to the articles of
incorporation; and (3) other fundamental transactions (e.g., mergers). See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 108 (2014) (requiring shareholders to elect directors upon
incorporation); id. at § 141(a) (allowing shareholders to select the provisions of the
governing state law they will include in their business’ certificate of incorporation); see
also Scarlett, supra note 110, at 45.
114. Goforth, supra note 15, at 629-30 (explaining that not only do “shareholders
have very little power in controlling, overseeing, or disciplining the managers of their
corporations[,]” but also, shareholders “have no say over day-to-day decisions about the
business”). See infra Parts I.C.2.b.ii (explaining why disclosures fail to ensure
communication), II.B.3 (discussing and re-conceptualizing shareholder rights).
115. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 38 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The duty to
act for the ultimate benefit of stockholders does not require that directors fulfill the
wishes of a particular subset of (stockholders) . . . (that) may have idiosyncratic reasons
for preferring decisions that misallocate capital.”).
116. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 107 (powers of incorporators); Grant v. Mitchell,
No. CIV.A. 18370, 2001 WL 221509, at *8 n.17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2001) (“The extent
to which an incorporator can refuse to name a board of directors until the first annual
meeting and manage the corporation pursuant to the powers [of incorporators under
Section 107] has never been decided.”); see Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at
1100 (acknowledging that state laws “generally allow[] firms to vary widely in their
approach, so long as the divergences are set forth in the corporate charter and are
effectuated in ways consistent with law”); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 24, at 72;
Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 8, at 39. See supra Introduction, Section A.
117. See Marchesani, supra note 78, at 332 (“[The] concept of ‘autonomy[]’ . . .
encompasses both freedom from interference and a positive aspect of self-governing.”).
See infra Part I.C.2, for a discussion of how there is insufficient legal recourse to hold
boards or directors liable for their actions.
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highly deferential to boards restrict the availability for shareholderrecourse against directors for losses incurred.118
C. THE INHERENT CONSEQUENCES OF INSULARITY
Boards are susceptible to opportunism, 119 collusion, 120 and
paternalism 121 because America’s current system of corporate
118.
119.

See infra Part I.C.2.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate
Governance Research 6-7 (Fisher C. Bus., Working Paper 2009-03-020 Nov. 2009)
(explaining that since the American Revolution, economics and scholars of corporate
law have recognized that “directors’ interests may not fully overlap with those of
shareholders”); Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The
Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and
Survey, 48 J. ECON. LIT. 58, 91 (2010) (“Directors have a fiduciary duty to protect
shareholders’ interests. Yet, their interests are unlikely to be perfectly aligned with the
shareholders.”).
120. See, e.g., Adams et al., supra note 119, at 92 (“The three-level hierarchy of
shareholders-directors-management generates some additional issues, such as possible
collusion between directors and management[.]”); Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 1473
(“[T]op managers of publicly held corporations have little incentive to adopt rules that
put constraints on their own positions. On the contrary, the incentive . . . may be to
insulate themselves from such constraints.”); Murphy, supra note 26, at 169 (“Although
this is beginning to change with respect to gender and race, boards continue to be
homogenous with respect to age, occupation, class, and status position. This gives
boards the likelihood of shared mental models attitudes, beliefs, and experiences that
contribute to group cohesion.”) (footnote omitted). Compare Bernice Grant,
Independent Yet Captured: Compensation Committee Independence After Dodd-Frank,
65 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 764 (2014) (asserting that a compensation committee ideally
diminishes conflicts of interest inherent to a “captured” board and explaining that this
“serv[es] the interests of management rather than shareholders” because the committee
“lacks the independence and objectivity that is necessary to determine executive
compensation in an arm’s length fashion”) (footnote omitted), with James D. Westphal,
Collaboration in the Boardroom: Behavioral and Performance Consequences of CEOBoard Social Ties, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7, 9-10 (1999) (supporting social interaction
between the CEO and board members because it facilitates collaboration and
encourages open communication and exchange of information).
121. Survey evidence shows “that American boards can be characterized as star
(‘hub-and-spoke’) social networks, with the CEO at the hub.” Adams et al., supra note
119, at 100, 66 n.15 (“With respect to monitoring the CEO, one imagines that directors
who have close ties to the CEO (e.g., professionally, socially, or because the CEO has
power over them) would find monitoring him more costly than directors with fewer
ties[.]”). “Interlock” demonstrates the reach of the power of CEOs throughout the
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governance engenders board insularity to extend to individual
directors. 122 Specifically, there is a “tension between the competing
goals of ensuring director independence and incentivizing [directors] to
perform at a high-quality level.”123
The modern corporate board’s predominance over director
elections and the unlikelihood of director removal corroborate the
conclusion that the desire to incentivize directors has circumvented
formalized attempts to deter directors from engaging in self-dealing.124
Consequently, boards are undeniably insular, and whether their
insularity manifests overtly or covertly, it tends to shield the directors
from accountability, frequently to the detriment of shareholders.125
1. Interests Will Diverge
Although the objective purpose of the board is to ensure that the
corporation is working to maximize the value of the company’s shares,
board operations remain under the direction of subjective actors. 126
corporate world. Interlock occurs when one firm’s employee sits on another firm’s
board, and vice versa. See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of
Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic
Literature, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 7, 18, (2003) (“These employees are generally the CEO
or another person high in management in their respective firms. Given this type of
relationship, the potential for collusive or quid pro quo behavior on the part of the
‘interlocked’ directors is particularly high.”); see also Grant, supra note 120, at 785.
122. See infra Part I.C.2.
123. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1067.
124. Lisa Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127,
138 (2010) [hereinafter Uneasy Case] (“Importantly, there is nothing to prevent
corporate officers from self-dealing—that is, engaging in transactions that benefit
themselves at the expense of the corporation.”) (footnote omitted); Molitor, supra note
6, at 99 (recognizing that board insularity “presents dangers that the directors will shirk
their responsibilities or, worse, serve their own interests at the corporation’s expense”);
see also infra Part I.C.2.a.
125. See infra Part I.C.2; see also Andrew Howard, Groupthink and Corporate
Governance Reform: Changing the Formal and Informal Decisionmaking Process of
Corporate Boards, 205 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 425, 428 (2011) (“When groups foster
an environment of camaraderie, cohesiveness may cause a group to avoid facing hard
questions and avoid conflict so it quickly reaches a consensus.”).
126. See Adams et al., supra note 119, at 94 (explaining that subjective concerns do
not dependably eliminate the consequences of the directors’ diverging interests
“reputational concerns are not sufficient to eliminate agency problems and they can, in
fact, create additional ones. With respect to the latter, reputational concerns can
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Specifically, even though directors are tasked to manage the corporation
with an objective goal of increasing the value of the common stock,
their personal preferences will undoubtedly permeate through their
decisions. 127 Directors might have personal investments in the
corporation or subconscious biases that will direct their conduct and
ultimately preclude the board from faithfully fulfilling its purpose. 128
This is particularly true because it is impossible to ascertain definitively
whether a director is capable of self-regulating. 129 Consequently,
shareholders may understandably be wary of board decisions, and many
proposed corporate reforms attempt to provide some method of recourse
for the shareholders to deter directors from succumbing to the
temptation of engaging in self-dealing.130
Further, in the context of a publicly held corporation, the personal
preferences of one shareholder invariably conflicts with that of
generate agency problems with respect to the agent’s choice of risky projects”) (quoting
Bengt Holmstrom, Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective, 66 REV. OF
ECON. STUD. 169, 182 (1999)).
127. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 15, at 6 (“The separation of ownership from
control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may,
and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit
the use of power disappear.”); Murphy, supra note 26, at 169 (“I’m always amazed at
how common groupthink is in corporate boardrooms. Directors are, almost without
exception, intelligent, accomplished, and comfortable with power. But if you put them
into a group that discourages dissent, they nearly always start to conform. The ones that
don’t often select out.”) (footnote omitted).
128. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1067 (explaining that “[t]he
more stock a director owns, the less independent the director becomes”); see generally
Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 1471-74 (categorizing divergent interests). But see
NASDAQ OMX Grp., supra note 77, at Rule 5605(a)(2) (“Nasdaq does not believe that
ownership of Company stock by itself would preclude a board finding of
independence[.]”).
129. See Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 1473 (“[T]op managers may fail even to
recognize that positional conflicts exist. . . . [They] usually believe (often, but not
always, correctly) that their actions are in the interest of the shareholders.”); see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 577 (2003) [hereinafter Means and Ends]
(describing the concerns of directors who recognize that if a company fails under their
direction, their “reputations and thus their future employability are likely to suffer”).
130. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 36 (N.J. 1981) (“Shareholders
have a right to expect that directors will exercise reasonable supervision and control
over the policies and practices of a corporation. The institutional integrity of a
corporation depends upon the proper discharge by directors of those duties.”).
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another. 131 For example, some shareholders have long-term interests,
while others are interested in fulfilling a short-term goal.132 Therefore, a
board might properly make a decision that does not immediately
maximize shareholder profits but potentially will yield a greater return
in the long-term.133

131. Not all shareholders will have identical expectations for the returns on their
investments in the company’s stock. Sharfman, supra note 59, at 400 (elaborating on
the value of centralized authority for publicly held corporations when it is known that
the interests of its members diverge and explaining that “[e]specially where there are a
large number of shareholders, it is much more efficient for the board of directors and
executive management, the corporate actors that possess an overwhelming information
advantage, to make corporate decisions rather than shareholders”) (footnote omitted).
Thus, when they relinquish their control over their investment to the board, it is
reasonable that they would expect the board’s oversight to be carried out by competent
guardians of their interest. See Roberta S. Karmel, Is The Independent Director Model
Broken?, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 775, 793 (2014) (explaining how the interests of
shareholders “diverge along a number of dimensions” and that “‘time horizons’ for
wealth maximization vary among” short-term and long-term shareholders); Stout, supra
note 100, at 795 (suggesting that corporate “rules that insulate boards from shareholder
pressures . . . serve[] the interests of investors who worry about director ‘shirking’ but
fear shareholder ‘sharking’ even more”) (footnote omitted); see also Hayden & Bodie,
supra note 15, at 2121 (concluding that the assumption that “shareholders have a
homogeneous interest in wealth maximization—is simply not true”).
132. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 15, at 2093-95 (2010) (arguing that board
insulation from shareholder involvement is intrinsic to ensure shareholders are not able
to promote their short-term interests at the expense of the long-term interest of the
corporation); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) (explaining that directors owe a duty of care that “extends to protecting the
corporation and its owners from perceived harm [even where] a threat originates from
. . . other shareholders”); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 655 (Del. Ch.
2008) (“Directors are not thermometers, existing to register the ever-changing
sentiments of stockholders . . . . During their term of office, directors may take good
faith actions that they believe will benefit stockholders, even if they realize that the
stockholders do not agree with them.”) (footnote omitted).
133. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“When
deciding whether to pursue a strategic alternative that would end or fundamentally alter
the stockholders’ ongoing investment in the corporation, the loyalty-based standard of
conduct requires that the alternative yield value exceeding what the corporation
otherwise would generate for stockholders over the long-term.”) (footnote omitted).
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2. There Will Not Be Enough Accountability
Directors are not afforded the same autonomy as boards under
modern corporate governance; 134 however, it is important to insulate
directors from liability in order to ensure people remain willing to serve
on boards.135 Although boards are not required to serve the interests of
individual shareholders, there are three types of lawsuits shareholders
may bring against a corporate board and its directors: state law
derivative suits,136 state law direct suits,137 and securities lawsuits.138
The designated purposes for shareholder litigation are deterrence
and compensation. 139 Nevertheless, these mechanisms do not permit
sufficient recourse for shareholders when boards fail to effectuate their

134.
135.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
In general, board activity is necessarily confidential. Consequently, decisions
of individual directors are relatively inseparable from board activity as a whole. Over
time, some regulations have sought to establish a different level of insularity for
directors. Nevertheless, these regulations ultimately fail to provide an adequate remedy.
See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797,
802 n.26 (2001) (“[T]here are ample reasons to doubt that directors have the time,
incentive, or information to monitor fully.”); E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein,
& C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of
Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 421 (1987)
(explaining that the DGCL “is designed to ensure that directors and officers are
adequately protected from liability resulting from the performance of their duties”).
136. These lawsuits concern breach of a fiduciary duty resulting in harm to the
corporation. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)
(stemming from shareholders’ complaint that directors’ approval of President’s
compensation package, including a $130 million severance payment, was waste and a
breach of their fiduciary duty).
137. These lawsuits concern breach of a fiduciary duty resulting in harm to
shareholders. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009)
(involving shareholders’ claim that the Lyondell board breached its fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty by failing to seek out other bids during a merger).
138. These lawsuits concern misrepresentations or inadequacies in corporate
disclosure and allow for claims that management misused its position to the
disadvantage of shareholders. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
(involving a claim made by the United States against Chiarella for allegedly violating
Rule 10(b)).
139. Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and
Theory Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 457, 461-65 (2011).
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duty to monitor the corporation.140 Recent efforts to reform corporate
governance and increase board and director accountability without
impeding their ability to fulfill their duties have failed.141
a. Existing Legal Standards Enable a Board and its Directors to Thwart
Liability
The Business Judgment Rule, 142 exculpation for duty of care
claims,143 indemnification,144 and insurance145 are some mechanisms that
protect directors from liability in shareholder litigation.146 Although it is
necessary to limit directors’ exposure to liability to attract individuals
for service, the practical effect of these existing protective measures is to
insulate directors and undermine potentially reliable constraints that
might persuade directors to focus on objectively managing the
corporation to maximize shareholder profit.147

140. Although directors owe a non-delegable fiduciary duty, breach is difficult to
prove, and restitution is very unlikely. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985) overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del.
2009); infra Part I.C.2.a.
141. See infra Part I.C.2.b.
142. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); Sprague &
Lyttle, supra note 8, at 3 (“But under the business judgment rule, shareholders are often
left with no legal recourse when their directors fail to maximize shareholder wealth.”)
(footnote omitted).
143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014).
144. Id. § 145.
145. Id. § 145(g).
146. See Marchesani, supra note 78, at 329 (explaining how fiduciary duties and
personal liability rules for directors not only “fail to create a sufficient incentive to act
in the best interest of the corporation,” but also “make it unlikely that a director’s
exposure to liability will provide a serious incentive to act”); Mary Siegel, The Illusion
of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 599, 600 (2013)
(disagreeing with “the conventional wisdom . . . that . . . the enhanced business
judgment rule, Revlon, entire fairness, Blasius, and Schnell . . . require substantial
judicial involvement and scrutiny[,]” and arguing instead that they apply “similar
deference” to directors’ judgment under the business judgment rule).
147. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Managing Expectations: Does the Directors’ Duty to
Monitor Promise More Than It Can Deliver?, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 416, 418 (2012)
[hereinafter Managing Expectations] (“[T]he nearly insurmountable standard for
imposing liability for oversight breaches at best may render the doctrine irrelevant for
purposes of encouraging appropriate director behavior, and at worst may undermine the
extent to which directors feel compelled to take their oversight role seriously.”).
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The Business Judgment Rule is the standard under which courts
adjudicate claims brought against directors. 148 It proscribes “hindsight
evaluations of decisions at the heart of the business judgment of
directors.”149 The Business Judgment Rule is not only highly deferential
to board members, but also extremely burdensome for claimants who
must plead facts sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of the
directors. 150 This is problematic because of the asymmetry of
information between a director and a shareholder.151
Directors generally owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation and, by extension, to its shareholders. 152 However, a
corporation’s certificate of incorporation may include “[a] provision
eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of

148. Under this standard, a court operates from a presumption that, in making a
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted (1) on an informed basis, (2) in
good faith, and (3) in the genuine belief the action in question was taken in the best
interests of the company. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
149. In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch.
2009).
150. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) overruled on other
grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (“The business judgment
rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power
granted to Delaware directors. The rule itself ‘is a presumption that in making a
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.’“) (citations omitted); Managing Expectations, supra note 147, at 434
(acknowledging that “[c]ourts have repeatedly emphasized the high hurdle shareholders
must cross in order to prove an oversight breach”); Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 8, at
15-16 (“From the earliest days of the corporation, courts have demonstrated a
reluctance to hold directors accountable for anything less than gross negligence or selfdealing.”).
151. It is often difficult for shareholders to successfully rebut the presumption
established by the Business Judgment Rule. See, e.g., Gantler, 965 A.2d at 707 (Del.
2009) (finding proof that the directors’ motive to entrench themselves was insufficient
to rebut the presumption without the inclusion of additional facts sufficient to state a
cognizable claim that the directors acted disloyally).
152. E.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000) (“A director’s duty to
exercise an informed business judgment implicates the duty of care.”); id. at 925 (“In
properly discharging their fiduciary responsibilities, directors of Delaware corporations
must exercise due care, good faith and loyalty whenever they communicate with
shareholders about the corporation’s affairs.”).
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fiduciary duty as a director.” 153 A provision exculpating duty of care
claims insulates directors from being held accountable from their actions
in any meaningful way.154 Essentially, it protects directors from liability
for any action, regardless of whether the action falls within the scope of
the directors’ traditional duties, unless the claimant can (1) obtain
evidence of the private workings of the board,155 and (2) meet the high
burden of proof necessary to succeed in a claim for breach of loyalty.156
For example, the Supreme Court of Delaware found for the
directors in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan where shareholders had
claimed that the Lyondell board breached its fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty by failing to seek out competing bids during a merger. 157
Lyondell’s incorporating charter included a provision exculpating
directors from personal liability for breaching the duty of care. 158
Although directors cannot exculpate the duty of loyalty, the shareholders
failed to establish that the Lyondell directors’ shortcomings also
implicated the duty of loyalty.159 Specifically, the shareholders failed to
prove that the directors, as fiduciaries, “intentionally fail[ed] to act in
the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for
153. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
2.02(b)(4)(A)-(B) & (D) (2010).
154. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 501 (Del. Ch. 2003) (explaining that in
In re Baxter International Inc., 654 A.2d 1268, 1270 (Del. Ch. 1995), the court held that
where a corporate charter insulates directors from liability for breaches of the duty of
care, “a serious threat of liability may only be found to exist if the plaintiff pleads a
non-exculpated claim against the directors based on particularized facts”) (emphasis in
original); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA.
L. REV. 477, 479 (2000) (“Exculpatory charter provisions adopted pursuant to statutes,
almost universally enacted since Van Gorkom, have rendered the damages claim for
breach of the duty of care essentially non-existent.”); Christine Hurt, The Duty to
Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 275 (2014) (explaining that where corporations adopt
provisions exculpating their directors from liability for breaches of the duty of care,
shareholders must “point to specific decisions made by the boards of directors” and
“show that these decisions were not only grossly negligent (to overcome the business
judgment rule), but also in bad faith (to overcome any applicable exculpation clause)”).
155. See infra Part II.A.
156. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65-67 (Del. 2006).
157. Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009).
158. Id. at 239 (necessitating a finding that the duty of loyalty was breached in order
to hold exculpated directors liable where an exculpatory provision in the charter of
incorporation protected the “directors from personal liability for breaches of the duty of
care”).
159. Id. at 244.
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his duties.”160 Thus, although the board’s decisions did not apparently
contemplate shareholder wealth maximization, the shareholders had no
recourse for remedy absent evidence that was essentially impossible to
obtain.161 Additionally, it is notable that the shareholders did not bring
this claim against a single director, but rather the entire board, despite
the unlikelihood that the entire board oversaw all details of the intended
merger.162
Although state corporate laws generally insulate board activity
from outside review, shareholder derivative litigation permits
shareholders to take legal action against directors’ alleged
mismanagement of the corporation or breach of their fiduciary duties.163
However, a self-dealing transaction may remain insulated from attack
under state laws because shareholders cannot successfully bring a suit
against directors on behalf of the corporation without approval from a
special litigation committee (“SLC”). 164 Courts review an SLC’s
dismissal of a suit under a deferential standard:165 unless “the [decision]
160. In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 67; see also Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 A.2d
at 243 (“In the transactional context, [an] extreme set of facts [is] required to sustain a
disloyalty claim premised on the notion that disinterested directors were intentionally
disregarding their duties.”) (quoting In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 654
(Del. Ch. 2008)).
161. See supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1) (2014).
163. See Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1286 (“Directors are punished for self-dealing
by electoral removal, hostile takeovers, or derivative litigation. Although none of these
is [sic] likely to happen to a particular board of directors, their aggregate pressure, at
least theoretically, disciplines directors to act in the stockholders’ interests.”) (footnote
omitted).
164. See McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191, 193 (Del. Ch. 1931) (“[A] stockholder
cannot be permitted . . . to invade the discretionary field committed to the judgment of
the directors and sue in the corporation’s behalf when the managing body refuses.”);
see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 783-85 (Del. 1981).
165. Although SLCs face a higher standard to dismiss a derivative suit than board
activity that falls under the protection of the Business Judgment Rule, the threshold is
still too low: (1) the SLC members must be independent, and (2) the SLC must have
made a good-faith investigation of reasonable scope to form a reasonable basis
supporting its conclusion. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89. See London v. Tyrrell, No.
3321-CC, 2010 WL 877528, at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2010) (“The second step of the
analysis is discretionary. The court applies its own business judgment to the facts to
determine whether the corporation’s best interests would be served by dismissing the
suit.”); see also Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) (“Independence is a
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does not appear to satisfy the spirit of the requirements[,]”166 the SLC
may refuse to file the lawsuit and stop litigation. 167 Ultimately,
disinterested director approval will shield a corporation from future
legal attacks, even with respect to self-dealing transactions, such as
overly generous CEO compensation packages.168
Indemnification provisions are problematic because the promise of
indemnity subverts the deterrence rationale for shareholder litigation and
creates a moral hazard problem. 169 Most states permit corporations to
adopt indemnification provisions to indemnify their directors. 170
Because nearly all corporations want to recruit sophisticated individuals
to serve as directors, most offer indemnification as an incentive. 171
Directors already are under an improbable threat of personal liability. If
directors know they will be indemnified in the unlikely event that they
incur legal costs, they are even less likely to protect themselves against

fact-specific determination made in the context of a particular case.”); Kaplan v. Wyatt,
499 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Del. 1985) (proceeding to second step of Zapata is
discretionary). But see Joseph M. McLaughlin, Special Litigation Committees in
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Apr. 25, 2010, 10:20 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/04/25/speciallitigation-committees-in-shareholder-derivative-litigation/#2 (“SLC members are not
given the benefit of the doubt as to their objectivity.”).
166. See Tyrrell, 2010 WL 877528, at *11.
167. See, e.g., Zapata 430 A.2d at 788 (explaining that following action taken by an
SLC, a corporation “should have the burden of proving independence, good faith and a
reasonable investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith and
reasonableness”).
168. Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 855, 882 (2014).
169. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 414 (2005) [hereinafter
Spare the Rod] (“The combination of indemnification provisions and [directors and
officers’] insurance essentially eliminates directors’ financial liability for breaching
their fiduciary obligations.”).
170. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014) (shielding directors from
liability for breaches of their duty of care). Note, however, that indemnification is
permissible in direct, but not derivative, shareholder suits. In derivative litigation,
insurance protects directors from incurring personal expenses from liability. See
Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1067 (2006).
171. Spare the Rod, supra note 169, at 451 (indemnifying directors from breaches of
the duty of care both minimizes their individual risk and incentivizes what would
otherwise be a less attractive secondary employment).
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risk. 172 Similarly, the use of indemnification undermines the
compensation policy rationale of shareholder litigation because the
corporation pays for the wrongdoing.173 The corporation’s legal costs, as
well as any potential negative publicity from a lawsuit, negatively
impacts its stock value.174
Lastly, most state business codes allow corporations to purchase
director insurance. 175 The availability of insurance subverts the
deterrence purpose of shareholder litigation and creates a moral hazard
problem. 176 Although a corporation can indemnify its directors from
liability in direct lawsuits, corporations can also acquire insurance to

172. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591,
600-01 (1983) (“Although there is no adequate guide to either the economic or practical
impact of such settlements in due care litigation, any impact is reduced by the ready
availability to directors of indemnification and insurance. Moreover, corporate practice
reflects a trend toward the use of such protective devices.”) (footnote omitted); John
Armour, Bernard Black, & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J.
1345, 1397-98 (2012) (“A case can be made that independent directors acting honestly
should face some risk of personal liability for severe dereliction of duty, even without
self-dealing. As we have seen, however, Delaware courts have adopted a tough
“conscious disregard of duty” standard for a plaintiff to show director lack of good faith
at companies which have adopted Section 102(b)(7) charter provisions to eliminate
director liability absent self-dealing or lack of good faith. The Delaware courts have
never found the “conscious disregard” standard to have been met.”) (footnote omitted).
173. Indemnification provisions compel a corporation to internalize the risk of
losses incurred by its directors. This creates a moral hazard because the promise of
indemnity encourages excessive risk-taking by allowing directors to externalize risks
onto the corporation. Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability:
Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 418 (2004).
174. See Black et al., supra note 170, 1059-60 (“Companies and their directors are
frequently sued under the securities laws and state corporate law, and settlements are
common. But the actual payments are nearly always made by the companies involved—
either directly or pursuant to directors’ rights to indemnification—or by a D&O insurer,
a major shareholder, or another third party.”) (footnote omitted).
175. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (granting corporations the power to
purchase insurance on behalf of directors against any liability incurred arising out of
their status in the corporation “whether or not the corporation would have the power to
indemnify such person against such liability under this section”).
176. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1086 (acknowledging that “[t]he
downside of insurance—[is] the moral hazard or shirking problem”).
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supplement their ability to protect directors’ interests in case any alleged
misconduct precludes the corporation from indemnifying its directors.177
b. Safeguards Created to Address the Issue of Insufficient
Accountability Have Failed
State courts and the SEC have attempted to increase director
accountability; however they have failed.178 Directors remain insulated
from liability and boards remain a self-perpetuating institution due to the
confidentiality of board-related activity and as a result of the amount of
deference afforded to boards.179
i. Judicial Attempts to Enhance Accountability
The actions of corporate boards are subject to enhanced judicial
scrutiny under Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co. and Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Incorporated. When a
corporation faces a hostile takeover, the target board’s use of a defensive
tactic triggers Unocal duties. 180 Alternatively, Revlon duties are
triggered when shareholders are exposed to a transaction that will be
their last chance to monetize their investment.181 Ideally, the Unocal and
177. See Veasey et al., supra note 135, at 404 (“Indemnification is not, of course, a
substitute for insurance: Insurance can protect the directors where indemnification
cannot, but indemnification can also protect the directors when insurance cannot.”).
178. See infra Part I.C.2.b.
179. See Fogel & Geier, supra note 8, at 66-68 (protesting that the current system of
corporate governance, which discourages shareholders from actively participating in
oversight of the corporation, leaves shareholders no choice but to sell their shares when
they are dissatisfied with management, and this system “perpetuates itself, and by virtue
of this ultimate lack of accountability, has made American companies less competitive
in the world”); Siegel, supra note 146, at 600 (explaining that judicial doctrine
purporting to provide enhanced scrutiny of board activity not only fails to increase
accountability, but also “create[s] high[er] burdens for plaintiffs”).
180. A board’s defensive actions in response to a potential hostile takeover are
subject to the Unocal test, which requires (1) reasonable perception of harm to
shareholders, and (2) reasonableness of action in relation to the threat posed. See
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
181. A board’s defensive actions in response to an impending hostile takeover are
subject to the Revlon test, which generally requires strict shareholder wealth
maximization where the board must pursue a rational course of action designed to
maximize shareholder welfare. See Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 501 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986).
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Revlon duties would prevent subjective director conduct that would not
be deterred by the threat of liability under the Business Judgment Rule.
Additionally, the compelling-justification test articulated in Blasius
Industries v. Atlas Corp. intends to preclude boards from acting solely to
thwart shareholders from exercising their right to vote to elect
directors. 182 The equitable remedy created in Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. intends to prevent inequitable action—like perpetuating
a board in office by changing the date and location of the annual
meeting to prevent a proxy content against management—”simply
because . . . [it is] legally possible.” 183 Realistically, however, these
mechanisms do not increase board accountability because they fail to
enhance judicial oversight of board activity.184
The Unocal and Revlon tests remain largely deferential to boards’
exercise of their business judgment. Board activity scrutinized under the
Unocal standard has remained highly deferential, essentially finding that
a target board’s use of defensive tactics was permissible where the board
has merely complied with its fiduciary duties.185 Similarly, application
of “enhanced” business judgment under Revlon to determine whether
directors have acted to maximize “the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit[,]” 186 is tempered by judicial recognition of the
fact that the board is still exercising its business judgment and cannot
predict the future.187 Boards satisfy the “enhanced” standard by merely
182. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(holding where the board did not have a “compelling justification” to act “for the
primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power[,]” that “even
finding the action taken was taken in good faith, it constituted an unintended violation
of the duty of loyalty that the board owed to the shareholders”).
183. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439-40 (Del. 1971).
184. Siegel, supra note 146, at 624 (dubbing the enhanced business judgment test
articulated in Unocal as “little more than a paper tiger”); id. at 630 (“Delaware courts
most often defer[] to independent boards under Revlon as well.”); id. at 645-46 (stating
that Blasius and Schnell mandate judicial review, but “courts have made the hurdle to
triggering either of these tests so high that that two tests are rarely used”) (emphasis
added).
185. See id. at 622-23 (“[N]ot only are board highly successful (seventy-nine
percent) under Unocal, but boards consisting of a majority of independent directors are
almost guaranteed to win: Only four independent boards have failed Unocal.”).
186. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 182.
187. In Re Fort Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 699, 722 (1988)
(explaining that when scrutinizing board activity under the Revlon requirement that a
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exercising business judgment with the additional requirement of
showing that possessed sufficient knowledge of the market to ensure the
transaction price was adequate. 188 Although courts cannot remain
deferential to boards when applying the Blasius standard and the Schnell
doctrine,189 courts only reluctantly hear cases triggering these tests.190

disinterested board act in good faith to promote shareholder interests, the relevant
consideration is the “intended” rather than the actual effect of the board’s decision, “for
the validity of the agreement itself cannot be made to turn upon how accurately the
board did foresee the future”); see also Franklin A. Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1545 (2013) (rejecting Revlon as standard guiding
directorial conduct since “there really is no sensible underlying rationale for the
doctrine”).
188. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000) (“Those methods may
include conducting an auction, canvassing the market, etc. There is, however, ‘no single
blueprint’ that directors of Delaware corporations must follow.”) (footnote omitted);
Siegel, supra note 146, at 629-30 (“Of the thirty-nine cases that found a corporation to
be in a Revlon mode, courts in thirty-one cases (or seventy-nine percent) held that the
boards had met their Revlon duties. Of those cases with successful outcomes, seventyseven percent had boards with a majority of independent directors.”) (footnotes
omitted).
189. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661-664 (Del. Ch. 1988).
Blasius requires more than mere satisfaction of fiduciary duty and good faith exercise
of business judgment. A compelling reason for action must be given to justify action
with intent to prevent shareholder vote on director election. Id. at 661. Similarly,
Schnell demands scrutiny of board activity that is legal per se if it seems inequitable.
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). Thus, these
standards, which are applicable only under specific circumstances, mandate judicial
review.
190. As of 2013, only five cases have been found to trigger the Blasius test in
Delaware courts, and the courts did not find compelling justification for the actions of
the boards under scrutiny in four of the cases. “[A]t best, only one passed. The small
number of cases under Blasius [sic] indicates the courts’ reluctance to invoke a test that
is impossible—or nearly so—for boards to pass.” Siegel, supra note 146, at 643-44
(footnote omitted). As of 2013, only thirteen cases have been found to trigger the
Schnell doctrine, “[d]espite its forty-plus year history, and its facial applicability to any
aspect of corporate law[.]” Id. at 644 (footnote omitted). In ten of the thirteen cases,
courts found a Schnell violation and struck down board action. Id. at 644 n.91. Courts
are reluctant to invoke the Schnell doctrine because “allow[ing] courts, without
boundaries or guideposts, to invalidate otherwise legal conduct . . . could ‘imperil[]’ the
stability of Delaware law.” Id. at 644.
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ii. Federal Attempts to Enhance Accountability
Although corporate law remains under the purview of the states, the
federal government has previously intervened in response to national
economic crises. 191 The overarching theme of federal regulations has
been investor protection. 192 The SEC has pursued this goal by
promulgating requirements for mandatory disclosures,193 proxy rules,194
and director independence.195
191. Pinto, supra note 6, at 263-64 (2010) (“Much of the development of federal
law involves corporate governance and has been the result of significant corporate
financial scandals and the perceived need for a federal response. A federal response
signifies the importance of protecting the public investors and stock markets and the
inability of state law to deal with systematic problems.”). See also the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, and Investment Company and Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (following
the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the start of the Great Depression); Williams Act of
1968 (responding to the surge of hostile takeovers); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(following the 2000 bursting of the technology bubble and the 2001 corporate and
accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, etc.); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (following the 2008 financial crisis).
192. Note, however, this section does not recount every resolution or rule that
relates to corporate governance or boards of directors promulgated by the SEC. Instead,
it focuses on those particularly at issue right now. Marchesani, supra note 78, at 320
(explaining that by focusing on improvement of board monitoring, the latest reforms to
the current system of American governance confirm that the corporate board “acts
prevalently as the monitor of management for the benefit of the shareholders, thereby
reducing costs arising from the separation of ownership and control of the corporation
and the diffusion of shareholding”).
193. The disclosure requirements are generally unexacting. Although they might
increase transparency (e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, -11, -13 (1990) (requiring annual,
quarterly, and other reports on prescribed forms); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1990)
(requiring disclosure of beneficial ownership in excess of 5% of a corporation’s
shares)), they do not impose affirmative duties beyond honest disclosure with which a
board must comply. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5)(ii) (2012) (requiring a corporation
to disclose either that its board has at least one financial expert or to explain why it does
not); see also Murphy, supra note 26, at 149-50 (reporting zero shareholder
nominations as of a 2006 survey, three years after the SEC’s enhanced disclosure rules
intended to encourage board nominating committees to consider shareholder
recommendations took effect).
194. Proponents of shareholder proxy access seek to empower shareholders by
granting them direct access to submit information for a board to include in the
mandatory disclosures during an election. See supra Part I.A; Karmel, supra note 131,
at 781 (“SEC’s final rules required only a brief description of ‘significant economic and
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The purpose of electing an “independent” director is to mitigate the
impact of the directors’ diverging interests and the collusion throughout
the board, but by its definition it does not succeed.196 First, it is underinclusive because a majority shareholder that “had no ties to
management” would still be considered “independent.”197 Second, once
an “independent” director has served on a board, that director will
invariably lose any supposedly independent qualities. 198 Finally, the
personal relationships . . . between the director and the issuer.’”) (citing 43 Fed. Reg.
58522, 58523 (Dec. 6, 1978)); Insulating Boards, supra note 42, at 1687 (“Providing
shareholders with power and rights that enable them to hold directors accountable is
overall beneficial for companies and their long-term shareholders in both the short term
and the long term.”).
195. Velikonja, supra note 168, at 883 (“Relatively recent changes to federal
securities laws and listing standards have imposed a legal requirement that public
companies maintain majority independent boards and fully independent audit,
nominating, and compensation committees.”).
196. See supra Part I.C.1, for a discussion of directors’ diverging interests. See, e.g.,
Grant, supra note 120, at 764 (explaining that requiring, for example, that boards have
an independent compensation committee does not succeed in diminishing conflicts of
interest that arise when the committee lacks independence from management because
“[d]irectors who are nominally independent from management might still be subject to
organizational behavior factors such as norms of reciprocity, groupthink, polarization,
social cascades, and herding”); see also Marchesani, supra note 78, at 317 (“Common
definitions of Independence fail to consider all of the ties that affect directors’
independent judgment.”).
197. Directors, under existing definitions, are not independent if they have any
“material relationship” with the listed company. Under the NYSE listing requirements,
a material relationship may “include commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal,
accounting, charitable and familial relationships, among others.” NYSE Manual, supra
note 77, at §§ 303A.02, 303A.05. However, in addition to failing to require
consideration of personal or social relationships, there is nothing that prevents a
shareholder from serving on the board. In fact, under the NASDAQ requirements, it is
expressly stated that ownership of stock does not necessarily preclude a finding of
independence. See NASDAQ rules, supra note 77. Finally, while boards are instructed
to “broadly consider all relevant facts and circumstances” when determining whether a
perspective director has a material relationship with the company, the listed
relationships are merely suggestions offered for possible consideration. See Grant,
supra note 120, at 784-85; Marchesani, supra note 78, at 327 (“The new rules,
however, do not adequately consider personal friendships and, more generally, social
ties. An Independent Director may also fail to effectively carry out his responsibilities
because he lacks competence.”) (footnote omitted).
198. The designation of “independent” is problematic. See generally Dent, supra
note 49, at 1271 (explaining that under the current system of corporate governance
“legislation cannot create true board independence but only reduce formal contacts”);
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effect of the “independence” requirement ultimately serves to insulate
directors further from liability for board activity.199 Therefore, requiring
independent directors does nothing to prevent harm from interested
directors.
Most recently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (“SOX”) responded to contemporary economic crises by
attempting to temper board autonomy with increased transparency and
accountability.200
Fogel & Geier, supra note 8, at 48 (concluding definitively that “a director or nominee
who otherwise meets or exceeds the independence criteria [can] be independent”); Usha
Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051,
1067-68 (2013) (identifying how the federal government’s “enshrining the independent
board for the public corporation” is problematic because it “created an entity suitable
for but one purpose, dealing with managerial conflict” leaving corporate officers and
investors to make all corporate decisions) (referencing Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the
Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 783 (2011).
199. Because judicial mechanisms purporting to increase board accountability are
especially deferential to decisions made by “independent” directors, the problems posed
by insufficient accountability and entrenchment are self-perpetuating. See Siegel, supra
note 146, at 621 (providing statistics for the amount of deference afforded to directors
under the Unocal test); Marchesani, supra note 78, at 318 (explaining that while the
most recent federal reforms made progress in beginning to clarify the definition of
“independence,” their corresponding rules “not only fail to take into account any of the
additional personal characteristics that an effective director needs to have, such as
motivation, competence, and time availability, but also fall short of addressing all of the
existing structural issues”); see also supra Part I.C.2.b.i.
200. For example, § 971 of Dodd-Frank addressed the SEC’s ability to determine
the extent that shareholders would be allowed to access a corporation’s proxy
solicitation materials. Subsequently, the SEC issued Rule 14a-11 granting shareholder
proxy access at all publicly held corporations. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (2011).
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit Court vacated the rule. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d
1144, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding, in part, that the SEC “relied upon insufficient
empirical data when it concluded that Rule 14a–11 will improve board performance and
increase shareholder value by facilitating the election of dissident shareholder
nominees”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-94 (2010) (ordering the SEC to issue
rules directing stock exchanges to require independent compensation committees); Lisa
M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay’s Impact on Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 55 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1, 18 (2013) [hereinafter Sue on Pay] (“The compensation reforms under
Dodd-Frank also seek to enhance board accountability.”); Karmel, supra note 131, at
786 (“Dodd-Frank further tightened the independence requirements for compensation
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Notably, pursuant to § 301 of SOX, all boards must have an audit
committee wholly comprised of “independent” directors. 201 In
compliance with SOX, the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange
(“Amex”), and NASDAQ submitted proposed corporate governance
reforms to their respective listing standards for approval by the SEC.202
committees, requiring that each member of compensation committees be independent
and clarifying the standards by which committee members are determined to be
independent.”). Similarly, reforms under SOX fell short of their intended goal. New
listing requirements in compliance with SOX require “companies adopt and disclose
corporate governance guidelines addressing director qualification standards and director
orientation and continuing education.” Marchesani, supra note 78, at 327. However, the
boards may elect not to have a financial expert on their auditing committees provided
they “explain” why, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7265, and while the
stock exchanges require all directors on the auditing committee be “financially literate,”
boards retain discretion over defining when that designation applies. NYSE Manual,
supra note 77, at § 303A.07 (“Each member of the audit committee must be financially
literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the listed company’s board in its business
judgment, or must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after
his or her appointment to the audit committee.”); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra
note 78, § 301 (ordering the SEC to issue rules directing stock exchanges to require
boards of publicly held corporations to conform their listing standards to the
requirements under § 301, primarily concerning director independence, board
committees, and disclosure policies); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1829 (2007) [hereinafter Social
Construction] (“A palpable theme in much of SOX is . . . insistence on more public
accountability, so that large business corporations meet standards resembling those
commonly expected of public and quasi-public institutions.”). But see Velikonja, supra
note 168, at 864 (“Most public companies have maintained a majority independent
board since at least the late 1980s.”).
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201(3), 78j-1(m)(2)-(3) (2010).
202. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications
between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Securities Act Release No. 8340,
Exchange Act Release No. 48,825, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,262, 68
Fed. Reg. 66,992 (Nov. 28, 2003) (“Specifically, we are adopting enhancements to
existing disclosure requirements regarding the operations of board nominating
committees and a new disclosure requirement concerning the means, if any, by which
security holders may communicate with directors. These rules require disclosure but do
not mandate any particular action by a company or its board of directors; rather, the
new disclosure requirements are intended to make more transparent to security holders
the operation of the boards of directors of the companies in which they invest.”)
(emphasis added); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002 AND CURRENT PROPOSALS BY NYSE, AMEX AND NASDAQ 37 (2003),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/en_us/us/sarbanes-oxley/assets/final_so_wp_2boardsac.pdf.
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The extent to which the stock exchanges elected to implement SOX
varied, but they all complied with the minimum requirements.203
These federal reforms focusing on director independence as a way
to increase board accountability fail at a conceptual level. 204
Specifically, these protective measures are fundamentally flawed
because they depend on the amorphous “independent” director.205 For
example, although SOX outlines the requisite criteria to consider a
director “independent,” the criteria are vague and include a discretionary
provision whereby the SEC may exempt the requirements for being
considered independent. 206 Additionally, requirements that rely on the
203.
204.

Social Construction, supra note 200, at 1824-25.
Howard, supra note 125, at 428-29 (explaining that “[e]ven if the board
members are not associated with the corporation, or do not have common business
enterprises, they still share the common reasons for seeking a board position and the
prestige that is attached to that position. This element is sufficient to create a level of
cohesiveness among independent board members, and the board at large, which puts the
entire board at risk of succumbing to the pitfalls of groupthink”); see also Velikonja,
supra note 168, at 867-73 (distinguishing the favored majority independent board from
the questionable desirability of supermajority independent board); Schumpeter:
Replacing the board, Economist (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/business/21612147-case-outsourcing-company-boards-replacing-board (echoing
the argument made by Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, to outsource company
boards in light of the abject failure of SOX and Dodd-Frank’s independence
requirements to ensure good-governance - pointing out that eight of Lehman Brothers’
ten directors were independent when the company went bankrupt and citing the
extraordinary appointment of Chelsea Clinton to the IAC board in 2011 but
recommending a hybrid of a majority of BSPs with a minority of positions reserved for
other corporate appointments).
205. Social Construction, supra note 200, at 1847 (“Current scholarship and practice
disagree substantially about what directors are supposed to do, and the resulting role
conflict has led to a good deal of tension and uncertainty in the boardroom.”);
Velikonja, supra note 168, at 903 (explaining that despite limited evidence of the
impact of independent corporate boards “independence has become a synonym for
something ‘noble,’ ‘expert,’ ‘objective,’ and ‘fair[,]’“ and independent directors
allegedly “tolerate less fraud and illegality” and “promote the firm’s compliance with
legal norms”); see also Marchesani, supra note 78, at 335 (explaining the inherent
dangers in the idealization of director independence where the government “mistakenly
relies upon individuals to have qualities of autonomy by virtue of meeting the definition
of independence”).
206. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B) (2010) (establishing the criteria for being
considered independent); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(C) (2010) (creating an exemption to
the requirement of having an independent director). While it granted broad discretion to
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so-called “independent” status of a director are fatally flawed because
the designation of “independent” will not continue to have the same
meaning for any extended period of time.207
Other provisions of SOX impose ineffective reforms that distract
boards from fulfilling their primary obligations. 208 For example, SOX
requires boards to comply with accounting standards. Although it is in
the interest of shareholders to have a board audit the corporation
consistent with industry standards, 209 the requirement does little to
enhance expectations for shareholders that directors will act objectively
for shareholder profit.210 Additionally, SOX does not appear to consider

the stock exchanges in . . . the purpose of a federal regulation is to establish a national
standard and by failing to articulate a baseline, this reform created more confusion than
it resolved. Cf. Social Construction, supra note 200, 1819 n.12, 1824-25; Rodrigues,
supra note 198, at 1054, 1079-80 (explaining that there is further confusion in light of
the fact that under federal law, independence is “status-driven,” but under Delaware
law, the question of director independence is “situational” and cannot be determined ex
ante).
207. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Boardroom Confidentiality Under Focus;
Corporate Governance, N.Y.L.J. 1 (Jan. 23, 2014) (“[T]here are no regulations or laws
in the United States under which a long tenure would, by itself, prevent a director from
qualifying as independent.”); Murphy, supra note 26, at 174-75 (“The criteria for
directorial independence relate only to financial ties, employment, and family
relationship; they do not prevent the CEO, or the nominating committee working in
tandem, from nominating directors who are social friends, fellow members of a club,
association or charitable endeavor, or from taking into account a candidate’s probable
conduct as a team player on the board.”). But see Marchesani, supra note 78, at 350
(concluding that when existing independent directors confer upon other directors the
designation of “independent,” this status should be permanent).
208. Instead of creating a corporate responsibility for the board to oversee, SOX
creates additional board duties. E.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 29, at 544 (explaining
that a distinction exists “between a voluntary board decision to create a committee,
which may be modified or abolished at any time, and a regulation that imposes ‘long
term structural power-related distinctions between different groups of directors of the
same board[]’“) (footnote omitted).
209. Cf. Social Construction, supra note 200, 1838 (“[T]he required auditing of
internal controls has increased revenues substantially, and presumably profits as well.”).
210. Id. at 1847 (noting that SOX “adds substantial director workload unrelated to
wealth-maximization” and explaining how this is common problem: “The weak spot in
the independence movement has always been that a company’s senior management
dominates the selection of independent directors, which means management can select
for certain attitudes and preferences”).
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the proposition that “insider” directors are arguably more efficient and
knowledgeable about the corporation.211
II. TURNING DOWN THE HEAT
Part II of this Note proposes a reform to establish a clear national
standard for director elections in order to reconcile corporate
governance policies and practices that are incompatible with realizing
the primary purpose of the board. Part II.A explains why the insularity
of directors is important to incentivize individuals to serve on boards.
Part II.B argues that the extent to which boards are insulated from
external interference must be tempered with constraints that advance the
board’s cardinal purpose, which can be done without a complete
overhaul of current practice. Part II.B then demonstrates how a federal
regulation, narrowly-tailored to address the need to regulate the election
process, will mitigate the inherent consequences of insularity that are
exacerbated by boards’ control over director elections and directors’
ability to evade, by legal means, the threat of incurring personal liability.

211. See Managing Expectations, supra note 147, at 446-47 (questioning the ability
of independent directors to perform their oversight responsibilities effectively in light of
the fact that independent directors are “part-time” by definition, which means they
might not be able to devote enough time to (1) accomplish their ever-increasing
requirements; (2) “develop a meaningful understanding of the challenges facing their
corporations[;]” (3) interact with other directors and management; (4) establish
channels of communication through which to receive unbiased information); Velikonja,
supra note 168, at 862 (explaining how “the share of independent directors on the board
and the amount of relevant information that the board possesses are inversely
correlated[]” and “[a]s the board reaches the majority independence mark, the marginal
cost of the diminishing quality of information exceeds the marginal benefit of increased
independence”); see also Rodrigues, supra note 198, at 1069 (agreeing that “increasing
the independence of the rest of the board paradoxically reduces its autonomy by
reducing the number of its information channels and making the remaining few sources
all the more important”); Yaron Nili, Director Tenure: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG (Jan. 23, 2015, 9:02 AM),
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2015/01/23/director-tenure-a-solution-in-search-of-aproblem/ (explaining that proposals to automatically disqualify directors from being
considered “independent” after ten years of service has the effect of placing “an
arbitrary limit[] on the available pool of talent, where only a limited number of people
possess both the management experience and industry knowledge required to serve
capably as public company directors”).
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A. INSULARITY IS NECESSARY
If boards are to manage the business affairs of the corporation, they
must be largely autonomous.212 To remain autonomous, they must be
able to make decisions without the constant threat of liability.213 Thus,
despite the inherent consequences of board insularity, it is necessary to
insulate boards from direct oversight. 214 Specifically, the ability to
monitor the corporation without being encumbered by the fear of
intervention and with the assurance of limited liability is necessary
because, without these guarantees, the risk of legal liability would deter
people from serving on boards.215
Similarly, although positive law and corporate charters denote
boards’ duties, boards may delegate any of their responsibilities to
212. See John Wilcox, The Autonomous Board, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REG.
(Nov.
11,
2013,
9:22
AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/11/11/the-autonomous-board/
(“[D]espite
the embedded connections and dependence on management, the board is expected to
function autonomously.”); see also supra Part I.B.
213. Some of the reasons why it is important to insulate directors from the threat of
liability include the fear of discouraging directors from making risky decisions, which
might ultimately prove to be beneficial to the corporation, the reluctance of judges to
replace the judgment of directors who assumedly have business experience, in
hindsight, with their own, and the acknowledgment of the fact that directors are not
guarantors of the corporation. Managing Expectations, supra note 147, at 437-38; Katz
& McIntosh, supra note 207 (“In order for boards to function effectively, directors must
feel comfortable expressing their views in the boardroom on corporate matters honestly
and freely, without concern that their conversations will be made public.”).
214. This is not to say that boards should be insulated from all accountability.
Specifically, the regulation of director elections by providing for a transparent and
straightforward process and by giving shareholders the opportunity to contribute
meaningfully will offset the insularity of boards from oversight during the year. See
infra Part II.B. Contra Insulating Boards, supra note 42, at 1687 (“[E]xisting
theoretical learning and the available empirical evidence do not provide a basis for
insulating boards in the name of long-term shareholder value. To the contrary, they
support the view that existing (or higher) levels of board insulation produce long-term
costs that exceed their long-term benefits.”)
215. See, e.g., Means and Ends, supra note 129, at 605 (“[T]he diffuse nature of
U.S. stockownership and regulatory impediments to investor activism insulate directors
from shareholder pressure. Accordingly, the board has virtually unconstrained freedom
to exercise business judgment. Preservation of this largely unfettered discretion is, and
should always be, the null hypothesis.”). Contra Klein, supra note 60, at 156
(suggesting a heightened standard of review for board action in cases where there is a
significant threat to the shareholders’ franchise interest).
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committees, officers, or employees. 216 Corporate charters outline the
obligations of respective corporations’ boards, but they do not delineate
the requirements of each board member. 217 Instead, directors are
expected to execute their roles based on their collective subjective
understanding of what is required of them and within the scope of their
duties as board members. 218 Further, directors cannot be expected to
answer to individual shareholders.219 Directors must be able to anticipate
the aims of the shareholders and carry out the board’s supervisory duties
accordingly.220 Specifically, they must manage the corporation with the
objective to maximize shareholder profit.221 Thus, once the shareholders
216. One of the only mandatory requirements for all publicly held corporations is to
have a board of directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business affairs of the
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of
its board of directors.”) (emphasis added). Beyond this requirement, how a board
carries out its duties is discretionary and subject to the determination of each
corporation. See Managing Expectations, supra note 147, at 416-17 (explaining that
corporate boards generally delegate their responsibility to manage the day-to-day
operations of the board and instead the primary role of directors is merely to monitor
corporate officers and employees to ensure they are acting in the corporation’s best
interest).
217. See Adams et al., supra note 119, at 81 (“Each board of directors is likely to
have its own dynamics, a function of many factors including the personalities and
relationships among the directors, their backgrounds and skills, and their incentives and
connections.”).
218. See supra Part I.B-C for a discussion of the autonomous nature of the board
and the deference afforded to discretionary decisions that are not inconsistent with their
fiduciary duties.
219. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 1 (explaining that an investor in a
publicly held corporation generally only “has a small stake compared with the size of
the venture,” and “[t]he investor is therefore ‘powerless’“); Scarlett, supra note 110, at
57 (explaining how “efforts to insulate the board from legal liability necessarily
increases the board’s authority while decreasing shareholders’ ability to hold directors
accountable”); see supra Part I.C.1.
220. See supra Introduction, Section B.
221. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del.
1989) (“The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise . . . may not be delegated
to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to
sustain the corporate strategy.”) (citations omitted); see also Cohen & Schleyer, supra
note 90, at 111 (“The approach of the SEC and its staff reflects the general
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cede power, they relinquish their control over the management and
oversight of the company, and the only thing they can expect of the
board is profit maximization;222 the board has a free hand in determining
how that is done within the legal limit.223
B. BUT INSULARITY MUST BE CONSTRAINED
Corporate boards must be completely insulated from pressure by
non-shareholder corporate constituencies. 224 In fact, a duty that a
corporation owes to any non-shareholder constituent is subordinate to
the obligation of its board to maximize the value of the common
stock. 225 Accordingly, a corporate board should not be completely
insulated from pressure by the shareholders of the corporation. 226
understanding that, [because shareholders cannot direct the actions of the board], if a
proposal would bind the board of directors to a particular action, without enabling the
board to exercise its discretion, then the proposal may be excluded as contrary to state
law.”).
222. See supra note 15 and accompanying text, for a discussion of shareholders’
role as passive investors.
223. See supra Part I.C, for a discussion of the broad discretion afforded to directors
to exercise their business judgment.
224. Non-shareholder constituencies include employees, creditors, suppliers,
consumers, etc. David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
1013, 1013 (2013) (“Regard for the corporation’s various non-shareholder
constituencies . . . or for society more generally must not compromise the [corporate
management’s] primary obligation to its shareholders.”). Contra Blair & Stout, supra
note 34, at 253 (“[B]oards exist not to protect shareholders per se, but to protect the
enterprise-specific investments of all the members of the corporate ‘team,’ including
shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other groups, such as
creditors.”) (emphasis added).
225. See supra Introduction, Section A; see also Bainbridge, supra note 62, at 605.
Contra Blair & Stout, supra note 34, at 253.
226. The corporate board is the final decision-making authority of the corporation,
and it must have autonomy to exercise its decision-making power without interference.
However, the relevant “pressure” that the board should be cognizant of is the pressure
to manage the corporation in the interest of the shareholders. See supra Introduction,
Section B; Velikonja, supra note 168, at 862. Contra Why A Board? supra note 94, at
49 (agreeing that the board’s main objective is shareholder wealth maximization, but
arguing that the board should be able to function devoid of any external pressure);
Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 16, at 835 (agreeing that the board’s main
objective is shareholder wealth maximization, but arguing that because the board exists
to serve the interests of shareholders, shareholders have ultimate authority over the
board); A Critical Look, supra note 100, at 1272 (arguing that boards should be self-
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Nevertheless, boards remain equally protected from influence by
shareholder and non-shareholder constituents.227
The extent to which corporate boards can insulate themselves from
any meaningful oversight responsibilities—without violating a standard
of conduct—jeopardizes the integrity of the corporate form. 228
Shareholders entrust the board with absolute control over their
investments.229 The separation of control and ownership is the defining
attribute of a corporation, but when there is no mechanism for
accountability and the board has unfettered authority, shareholders can
no longer remain confident they will receive optimal returns on their
investment.230 This explains much of the prevailing lack of confidence in
boards.231 Consequently, board insularity must be constrained.232
When a board is completely insulated from outside influence, at
best, a director’s diverging interests will be subconscious and any
actions inadvertently influenced by the director’s subjective benefit will

perpetuating in order to allow directors to manage a corporation responsibly for the
long term).
227. See supra Part I.A; Managing Expectations, supra note 147, at 438
(acknowledging that “the high hurdle that must be cleared in order to hold directors
liable for breaching their oversight responsibilities may mean that fiduciary duty law
will not be able to play a significant role in ensuring directors’ vigilant adherence to
their oversight responsibilities”).
228. The fact that a corporate board has taken advantage of its ability to remain
within the letter of the law while going against the spirit of the law by comprehensively
insulating itself does not constitute a violation for which directors may be held
accountable. See Managing Expectations, supra note 147, at 438 (recognizing that
“[t]he relatively low threshold for satisfying the oversight duty . . . poses a danger that
companies will structure their oversight policies around the minimum requirements
needed to satisfy courts’ liability standard”); see also supra Part I.C.
229. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
230. Millon, supra note 224, at 1019 (“Ideally, accountability should provide the
incentives needed to ensure that management acts in the best interests of the
shareholders[.]”); Scarlett, supra note 110, at 57 (“In corporate law, authority and
accountability are competing powers that are in tension, because more of one means
less of the other.”); see supra Part I.C.2.
231. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part I.C.2, for a discussion of how personal liability rules and federal
regulations fail to create sufficient incentive for boards to fulfill their primary purpose.
Cf. Sharfman, supra note 59, at 401 (recognizing the need for a board to be able “to
wield its authority” but that it must to some extent be accountable to its shareholders).
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be unintentional. 233 Contrastingly, in the worst-case scenario, an
unqualified majority investor might become a director of a corporation
that has an exculpation provision in addition to director insurance.234 Not
only would that director be exempt from liability from a breach of the
duty of care for any intentional action taken in his or her self-interest to
the detriment of the overall value of the common stock, but the
corporation would also finance the remedy from any successful claim.235
Because the current standards for adjudication of claims brought
against directors are largely ineffective, the extent to which boards and
their directors are insulated from any recourse from engaging in selfdealing requires regulatory, as opposed to judicial, change. 236 The
existing regulations of boards exacerbate the inherent consequences of
insularity. 237 By imposing additional requirements on boards and
dictating how boards must carry out their traditional responsibilities, the
relatively new federal regulations further undermine the expectation that
their boards will focus on overseeing the management of the corporation
to maximize shareholder profit. 238 Thus, these reforms obscure the
primary purpose of the board.239 This is because while almost all board
233.
234.
235.
236.

See supra Part I.C.1.
See supra Part I.C.2.a
See supra Part I.C.2.a
Courts should continue to evaluate the conduct of directors “from the
perspective of maximizing shareholder profit.” Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 8, at 42
n.11; see, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 235 (1988); In re Citigroup, Inc.
S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009); see supra Part I.C.2.b.
237. Concededly, the policies underlying the federal regulations generally parallel
the aim for the board to monitor the corporation on behalf of the shareholders, for the
profit of the shareholders. See supra Part I.C. Nevertheless, they risk having the effect
of distracting boards from focusing on pursing their primary purpose without issuing
more forceful requirements to ensure this focus is not superseded by the positive law.
238. Managing Expectations, supra note 147, at 444 (explaining that since boards
have acquired greater responsibility, “from overseeing compensation packages and
structure, to more actively monitoring the director election process and engagement
with shareholders[,]” the time commitment required for board service has increased,
and ultimately “[t]his increased time commitment has implications for effective board
oversight because boards may be spreading themselves too thin by seeking to
accomplish an increasingly wide range of tasks”).
239. See Velikonja, supra note 168, at 904 (“The roles that independent directors
play in the corporation’s governance have dramatically expanded over the last forty
years. Independent directors are a plausible fix for any and all problems, and they can
credibly be sold as such.”) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see infra Part III.
Contra George S. Georgiev, Micro-Symposium on Competing Theories of Corporate
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activity was previously scrutinized under the business judgment rule,
now, directors’ failure to carry out these new obligations will have
specific consequences.240 Subsequently, they create the need for a new
national standard to ensure that the boards’ duty to oversee the
corporation to maximize shareholder wealth remains in the forefront.241
The ability of directors to entrench themselves on a board provides
the impetus for corporate boards to insulate themselves from any
external oversight.242 Specifically, the incumbent board’s monopoly over
director elections is intrinsic to the unrestrained insularity of publicly
held corporations from shareholder involvement. 243 In particular, the
difficulty of determining which director made what decision or how the
board specifically arrived at a decision raises concerns over the
operation of unconstrained boards, and modification of the processes of
director selection and election could resolve this issue.244

Governance: Shareholder vs. Investor Primacy in Federal Corporate Governance, 62
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 66, 76 (2014) (“To the extent these provisions interfere with
boards’ authority, they to do so in favor of investors–by seeking to provide the market
with adequate and accurate information in order to trade[.]”).
240. See Martin Lipton, The Spotlight on Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 8, 2014, 9:17 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2014/09/08/the-spotlight-on-boards-2/ (listing fifteen “general” expectations of
boards and offering five conditions for meeting these expectations, such as having
“directors who have knowledge of, and experience with, the company’s business, even
if this results in the board having more than one director who is no ‘independent’;”
providing “directors with regular tutorials . . . as part of expanded director education;”
and maintaining “a truly collegial relationship among and between the company’s
senior executives and the members of the board”).
241. Cf. Rodrigues, supra note 198, at 1055 (explaining that “because our law
effectively requires that most public board members be independent, the quality of
independence has become the defining feature of boards”).
242. See supra Part I.
243. See supra Part I.A.1.
244. Although the SEC’s disclosure rules purport to make board activity more
transparent, they fail because they merely require that corporation’s disclose some
isolated information on their governance process. The disclosure requirements do not
require boards to disclose the entirety of their actual process nor do they establish
mandatory requirements for consideration. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying
text. Further because of the inherent confidentiality of boards and the endogenous
nature of corporation, even where the disclosures render a board’s process apparent, it
is unlikely that individual director action will be subject to review. See supra note 121,
193 and accompanying text.
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Board operations are generally confidential not only because other
corporate constituents are not permitted to monitor the board,245 but also
because too much transparency would make a company vulnerable to its
competitors.246 It follows that shareholders, who are ordinary members
of the public, are neither suited nor qualified to monitor the board.247
Consequently, changing the law to permit shareholder oversight would
exacerbate some of the current problems faced in selecting directors to
oversee objectively the daily operations of the corporation like making
sure a director does not have ties to a competitor. 248 Specifically, it
would be far too costly to monitor each shareholder for any relation to
competitor and tailor information accordingly. 249 And thus, it is
ultimately easier to allow shareholders the opportunity to regulate who
becomes a director instead of what the board does.250
Director selection and election are important because the obscurity
of a board’s internal decision-making process makes it near-impossible
to remove a director and, as a result, essentially guarantees that the
problems will not be remedied. 251 Replacement of directors might
245. Although the board can delegate many of its duties to special committees and
executive officers, a board cannot delegate its duty to monitor the corporation and
oversee its management on behalf of the shareholders. See supra Introduction, Section
C.
246. See, e.g., Katz & McIntosh, supra note 207 (describing three categories of
confidential, non-public corporation information, the unauthorized disclosure of which
“could imperil a company’s competitive advantage or commercial success . . . [or] lead
to illegal insider trading and manipulation of the company’s stock price”).
247. See Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 7, 2005) (“Delaware’s corporation law vests managerial power in the board of
directors because it is not feasible for shareholders, the owners of the corporation, to
exercise day-to-day power over the company’s business and affairs.”); cf. Rodrigues,
supra note 198, at 1082 (recognizing that if shareholders were responsible for
overseeing management of the corporation and dealing with managerial conflicts,
“[i]ssues of confidentiality and the dangers of extortionate behavior would arise”).
248. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
249. See infra Part II.C.2.b.ii.
250. See infra Part II.B.1.
251. Director removal “for cause” is difficult to accomplish. See supra Part I.A.2.
Director removal “without cause” is a bad standard to adopt because constantly
subjecting directors to the threat of removal subject to any arbitrary explanation would
discourage directors from actively carrying out their duties for the board. Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 807 (1983) (“[A]llowing the majority of
shareholders to remove the directors at will can needlessly disrupt the centralized
management services that directors are supposed to provide.”). Similarly, a standard for
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remain difficult under this new regime because incumbent boards would
largely retain control over the election slate, and thus directors will
remain relatively “irreplaceable;” however, mandatory reforms directed
toward regulating the director election process will grant shareholders
the security that they elected the proper person in the first place. 252
Additionally, allowing shareholders greater authority to intervene and
dictate boards’ agendas and decisions would only lead to more
problems.253 Specifically, constraint of board insularity calls for the SEC
to reform mandatory federal rules and set baseline requirements from
which boards must structure how their corporation selects and elects
directors.254
1. Electing Directors
Although the current practice of having directors select the slate for
director elections is flawed,255 allowing incumbent directors to remain
responsible for selecting the slate on the condition that they comply with
a new process would mitigate many of the flaws. A new standardized
process to elect directors that both establishes a threshold for the
minimum involvement a corporation must guarantee its shareholders
and considers the endogenous nature of corporate governance would
alleviate the threat of entrenchment, increase transparency, and limit
subjective considerations from influencing decisions on whom to elect

removal “without cause” would disincline people from wanting to sit on that board.
Treatise Law Corp § 9:14 (“[T]he statutory mandate that corporations shall be managed
by their boards of directors or under the supervision of their boards of directors is
weakened if directors can be removed at the whim of the shareholders.”).
252. This is because the new reforms will set a competency threshold and more
transparent vetting process for all elected directors. See infra Part II.B.1.
253. See infra Part II.B.3.
254. The SEC, the self-proclaimed “Investor’s Advocate,” states that its mission is
“to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.” The SEC explains that it depends on informed and diligent investors to
report alleged failure of corporations to comply with federal securities regulations. Thus
individual investors have access to a sophisticated advocate for their interests. See The
Investor’s Advocate, SEC.GOV, www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb.
25, 2014).
255. See supra Part I.A.1.a.
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to a board. 256 The corporate board might remain a self-perpetuating
institution under this new scheme. 257 Nevertheless, standardizing the
selection process and requiring the board to justify its nominees will
allow shareholders to be confident that qualified individuals are
safeguarding their investments; at the very least the increased
transparency would allow shareholders to make an informed choice not
to invest or to withdraw their investments.
a. Board Selection of Nominees
The first change must occur in the process by which boards select
nominees for election.258 A board, through its position as a fiduciary of
256. Some scholars propose to resolve the issue of board insularity by allowing
shareholder proxy access. E.g., Access to the Ballot, supra note 108, 43-44; Lisa M.
Fairfax, The Model Business Corporation Act at Sixty: Shareholders and Their
Influence, 74 LAW & CONT. PROB. 19, 28 (2011) (noting “the important weight that
shareholders have placed on the proxy-access issue”); McDonnell, supra note 56, at
116 (concluding that for shareholder proxy access, “the optimal default rule would
provide for relatively generous proxy access, and the optimal altering rule would allow
shareholders to opt out of the default rule in any direction they choose”); see generally
Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 121, at 8, 17 (explaining how “cross-sectional
analysis of boards is limited because of endogeneity issues”). Others align with the SEC
in favor of requiring independent boards. E.g., Marchesani, supra note 78, at 326-27
(advocating for a more definite framework to determine independence, but limiting the
inquiry of directorial competence to independent directors and also failing to recognize
that an individual’s qualities that permit that status change over time and the current
election scheme will not remedy the costs of this system). Meanwhile, other scholars
focus on solidifying director insulation from shareholder oversight. E.g., Grant, supra
note 120 (recognizing that the independence definition does not account for
“organizational behavior factors[,]” but attempting to resolve this by focusing solely on
the compensation committee and requiring continued professional education and
rotation of directors).
257. See supra Part I.A.1.a.
258. The incumbent board’s absolute control over director elections is an intrinsic
characteristic of boards that allows them to persist as self-perpetuating entities. See
supra Part I.A. Most existing reforms propose either to grant shareholders direct access
to a corporation’s proxy material, or to leave the director nominations wholly to the
discretion of a group of “independent” board members. See supra Part I.C.2. It is well
established that shareholders’ votes on the proposed slate are pretty much a formality.
See supra Part I.A. Further, it is well established that the asymmetry of information as
between directors and shareholders put shareholders at a disadvantage and preclude
shareholders from making optimal contributions. See Forbes & Milliken, supra note
107; see also infra notes 331-336 and accompanying text. Also, the goal of the board is
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the corporation, exercises its business judgment when it informs
shareholders of whom it believes would be best suited to serve as
directors. 259 Thus, as long as directors can articulate a reasonable
justification for selecting a nominee, they are essentially insulated from
the threat of interference.260
A mandatory rule requiring every corporate board to have a
selection committee (the “Committee”) may increase transparency and
limit a board’s ability to entrench unqualified directors. 261 The
regulation will require the Committee to conform to the following
requirements: (1) the Committee must be comprised entirely of
to oversee the corporation for overall shareholder wealth maximization. See supra
Introduction, Section B. If majority shareholders are allowed to become de facto board
members and dictate who will fill board positions, then minority shareholders probably
will not receive the best return on their investments, and not only will the majority
shareholders be taking over the board’s responsibilities, but the board will be unable to
ensure that the interests of all of the corporation’s shareholders are promoted equally.
Consequently, it is essential to strike a balance between board insularity and the
involvement of shareholders participating in electing the board.
259. In McMullin v. Beran, the Delaware Supreme Court defined the board’s
responsibility, in fulfilling its fiduciary duty, as requiring the board to “first, conduct a
critical assessment of (the relevant proposal) . . . and second, [to] make an independent
determination whether that transaction maximized value for all shareholders.”
McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000); see id. at 918 (“The statutory duties
and common law fiduciary responsibilities that directors of a Delaware corporation are
required to discharge depends upon the specific context that gives occasion to the
board’s exercise of its business judgment.”).
260. See supra Part I.C.2.a. Although the NYSE and NASDAQ require listed
corporations to have nominating committees wholly comprised of independent
directors, they fail to regulate or standardize the definition of what constitutes a
qualified director. Merely requiring boards to disclose what they determined were
qualifying factors without establishing any parameters or specifying what such
designations must entail would not prevent a board from stipulating that a qualified
director would be anyone who went to the same country club as an incumbent director.
See also supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
261. See infra Part II.B.1.b (conceding that directors will probably still be able to
entrench themselves in their positions once they have been elected onto the board, but
drawing attention to the fact that assuming compliance with the new regulation for
board composition, any entrenched directors will not be unqualified). This is
distinguishable from a nominating committee, because under the current system, the
nominating committee nominally has complete control over determining the slate. Here,
the Committee will be responsible for vetting the candidates and selecting those whom
the entire board will consider whether to nominate.
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directors; (2) the number of directors on the Committee must not be less
than two, but may not otherwise exceed 15% of the entire board; (3) the
Committee must first select a director to serve as Committee
representative at the selection meeting (the “Meeting”); 262 (4) the
Committee must take into consideration suggestions from the
corporation’s top-level managers, its shareholders,263 and the remainder
of the board, all of whom must fill out a form naming prospective
nominees and listing their qualifications for consideration; 264 (5) the
Committee must finalize the list of candidates it will include on a ballot,

262. Some corporations currently have staggered boards. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(d) (2014) (allowing corporations to stagger board elections every two or three
years). Under this reform, a corporation must assess the eligibility of every director,
every year. Thus, publicly held corporations will no longer be allowed to classify their
boards.
263. This regulation does not confer upon shareholders direct proxy access. Rather,
it guarantees shareholders the opportunity to have their nominations considered. It is
important not to conflate protection of the shareholder’s right to submit a candidate for
consideration for a nomination with the right to access the proxy material directly and
wield nominating power for two main reasons. First, informational asymmetries exist
between shareholders and directors, and shareholders are at the disadvantage. Second,
although the threat is de minimis, directors at least have the potential to incur personal
liability as a result of their decisions. Conversely, if shareholders possessed direct proxy
access, they would be able to be involved making decisions that would affect the
corporation without any possibility of being held accountable for their actions. See
Sharfman, supra note 59, at 402, 408; see generally Hamermesh, supra note 23, at 117,
156 (arguing that pursuant to their statutory right “to present proper business” at
shareholder meetings, shareholders have a statutory right to nominate directors that
“can be circumscribed through private ordering only in limited ways, to promote an
orderly electoral process” and identifying “pitfalls and steps that drafters of corporate
statutes and governance documents might consider in light of uncertainties about the
nature and scope of the shareholder’s right to nominate directors”).
264. The Committee would not be required to entertain suggestions made by nonshareholder constituents of the corporation. Although the nominations will be submitted
anonymously, every person eligible to submit a nomination will receive a randomized
voter ID number. Nominations will be submitted electronically. Only qualified
candidates will be considered. See infra Part II.B.1.a, for a discussion of qualifying
characteristics. Compare Nicola Faith Sharpe, Rethinking Board Function in the Wake
of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 5. BUS. & TECH. L. 99, 109 (2010) (explaining that most
corporate boards are comprised of directors who are “not qualified to assess the
strategic viability of the corporations they direct”), with Murphy, supra note 26, at 168
(“Since all directors are “hand picked” by the same process, they join the board as
colleagues of other “very smart, highly influential and experienced people” who have
met the same demanding criteria of selection.”).
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on which the board will vote at the Meeting; and (6) the Committee
must prepare a voting packet (the “Packet”) that will include an
informational sheet for each candidate, listing the candidate’s
qualifications for serving on the board.265 Additionally, the Packet must
include a list of those nominees suggested for consideration that the
Committee did not include on the final ballot but otherwise would be
eligible candidates.266
The ballot will provide at least two, but no more than the number of
directors who served on the Committee, blank spaces for write-ins of
nominees listed in the Packet. If a candidate from the supplemental list
receives a majority of votes at the Meeting, the final slate will include
candidates nominated via this write-in process.267 Thus, regardless of the
protocol proscribed by each corporation’s bylaws, ballots would not
necessarily present more candidates than would be included on the final
slate, lessening the threat of entrenchment.268
This mandatory reform of the selection process will permit
corporations to determine the eligibility factors that the Committee will
list in each Packet. 269 Under this regulation, a corporation might also
require its Committee to include a list of nominees the Committee did
not include on the ballot with an explanation of why the Committee did
265. It is also important to note that the nominations are anonymous, so the Packet
and information that the Committee produces will not distinguish candidates nominated
by shareholders from those nominated by corporate officials. See infra Part II.B.1.a, for
a discussion of qualifying characteristics. Contra Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive
Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 495 (2012) (indicating who
nominated whom and making clear who was responsible for the corresponding content
in the proxy materials).
266. See infra Part II.B.1.b, for a discussion of qualifying characteristics (allowing
the Committee to balance the factors affecting a candidate’s qualification and
permitting a finding of “incompetent” despite not having one of the pre-determined
disqualifying characteristics).
267. This will ensure a Committee does not have the final say on which incumbent
directors are considered for re-election, should they meet the qualification standards
discussed. See infra Part II.B.1.b.i. This will also prevent a Committee from being able
to decide unilaterally that the remainder of the board will not have the option to
consider alternative legitimate candidates. Also, this departs from the traditional
plurality voting rules. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2014) (“Directors shall
be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares.”); see also supra note 90.
268. Access to the Ballot, supra note 108, at 45 (explaining that when the directors
nominated by the company run unopposed, their election is guaranteed).
269. See infra Part II.B.2.
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not include those contenders.270 Further, the corporation’s bylaws will
specify the voting method that the board will employ during the
Meeting.271 The corporation will require that the directors either rank all
candidates on the ballot according to preference or select only the
number of nominees that will appear on the final slate without
classifying individual preference.272 Allowing each corporation to decide
the technical voting method will adequately balance the SEC’s interest
in restricting the boards’ control over director elections with the
corporations’ need for flexibility in structuring their individual systems
of governance.273
Although a Committee consisting entirely of directors is potentially
problematic because the Committee members would most likely include
themselves on the proposed ballot, the Committee only suggests the
candidates for the board to consider for selection as nominees. 274
Further, the second requirement limits the amount of incumbent
directors involved in constructing the ballot, whereas the entire board
will vote on the final slate independently and anonymously.275 Thus, the
Committee would not have the final say over whom the board included
on the final slate.276
After the Committee submits the ballot and Packet to the board, a
Meeting will be held where the directors have time to read the Packet
270. A requirement for the Committee to justify its decisions by articulating an
unbiased explanation for its judgment of each candidate would force the Committee to
eliminate overt influence of members’ personal preferences and instead base their
assessments on logical factors. Thus, if a well-intentioned Committee were driven by
inherent subconscious biases, it would be forced to justify its decisions to the remainder
of the board—and potentially shareholders—and establish that it reached decisions
based on objective criteria. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
271. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2014) (“In the absence of such
specification in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws . . . Directors shall be elected
by a plurality of the votes[.]”).
272. Id.
273. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 83, at 334 (“A central argument . . . is that, even
assuming that [proxy] access is beneficial for many public companies, the optimal
approach is to retain no-access as the default arrangement and let the provision of
shareholder access evolve through the adoption of an access arrangement on a
company-by-company basis.”).
274. See generally supra Part I.A.1, for a discussion of how incumbent boards
dominate director elections and have reciprocal interests in perpetuating their status as
directors.
275. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 267-268 and accompanying text.
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and ask the Committee representative to clarify anything regarding the
eligibility of candidates. 277 After, the directors will independently
deliberate and anonymously submit their ballots.278 Directors will not be
able to speak with one another or leave the Meeting until they cast their
votes.279
If the results of a board’s vote at the Meeting are inconclusive (e.g.,
in the event of a tie), the board will have a second Meeting.280 During
the second Meeting, the Committee representative will present a closed
ballot with the candidates whose statuses were inconclusive after the
initial vote.281 The Committee representative will not inform the rest of
the board, including the Committee, of the candidates who received the
majority of votes at the first Meeting.282 Prior to the second Meeting, the
Committee representative will complete additional research on the
remaining candidates to help the rest of the board make a more informed
vote.283 At the second Meeting, after distributing the closed ballot, the
Committee representative will present to the board the results of the
research, and the Committee representative will objectively elaborate on

277.
278.

Cf. Marchesani, supra note 78, at 340-41.
Corporations might choose to assign the directors numerical identifiers to
preserve the integrity of the process; the paper trail would ensure transparency, and the
ability to match each director with his or her ballot would not only allow the board to
take corrective measures in case of singular error, e.g., discarding a defective ballot or
allowing a director to clarify an ambiguous marking, but also disincentivize sabotage.
279. To encourage the board to consider each candidate, depending on the size of
the board and the number of nominees in the Packet, the Committee representative will
specify a minimum amount of time that must pass before a director may submit a
complete ballot and leave the Meeting.
280. But see infra note 346 and accompanying text.
281. A candidate’s status would be inconclusive if he or she did receive either a
majority of votes or an overwhelming minority. The percentage at which a candidate’s
status constitutes an overwhelming minority will depend on the context. This would
differ from the current method of allowing the incumbent board to deliberate separately
after a slate is not passed. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
282. This will provide a check against collusion and help minimize the impact of
strategic and self-interested decision-making. See supra Part I.A.
283. Murphy, supra note 26, at 170 (“Despite the fact that directors are generally
highly qualified individuals, the flood of information with which they must work likely
leaves them never feeling completely informed. Directors are often inundated with
pages of information prior to board meetings. Given time constraints, director [sic] are
unusually unable to process this information.”).
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the qualifications of the remaining candidates.284 Finally, the rest of the
board, with the exception of the Committee representative, will vote.285
The resulting slate will be comprised of one nominee for each seat on
the board; however, the official shareholder ballot will also contain
blank spaces where shareholders will have the opportunity to “write in”
a candidate that was identified in a proxy contest.286
b. Board’s Responsibility to Inform Shareholders
Although each nominee runs independently for a position on the
board, the SEC’s regulation of the proxy materials that corporations
must include with their slates does not afford sufficient protection for
the few checks on board entrenchment the shareholders are actually
qualified to employ. 287 Thus, the next element of the current director
election process that must change is the information made available to
the shareholders regarding the final slate.288
Once the board decides on the final slate, it must disclose the
information contained in the Packet at the Meeting about each nominee
on the final ballot.289
c. Proxy Contests
Over time, each corporation will establish a baseline from which
the board could anticipate the cost of producing and disseminating the
proxy material necessary to inform its shareholders about nominees on

284.
285.
286.
287.

See infra Part II.B.2.
Cf. Marchesani, supra note 78, at 340-41.
See infra Part II.B.1.c.
Specifically, shareholders are qualified to make informed votes and to launch
proxy contests.
288. Although pursuant to SOX, corporations must disclose information about their
election process and policies, these requirements are largely ineffective. See supra notes
193, 244.
289. This proxy material will be comprised of information including the factors
underlying the determination that a nominee is qualified to serve on the board, how
much stock a prospective nominee holds in the company, and any of the nominee’s
significant business relationships or past involvement with other director nominees, toplevel managers, or majority shareholders in the corporation. See infra Part II.B.2.
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the slate.290 Under this reform, if a shareholder launches a proxy contest,
then the corporation will compensate the contest’s winner - either the
insurgent or a rebuttal on behalf of the incumbent board—for the
baseline amount.291 Further, the corporation will provide the shareholder
with a copy of the Packet that was distributed at the Meeting.292
Any disgruntled shareholder may launch a proxy contest, 293 and
eligibility will not be contingent upon satisfying an ownership threshold.
However, the corporation will only compensate a disgruntled
shareholder for proxy materials distributed if the insurgent had
submitted a timely suggestion to the Committee. 294 If the insurgent
elected not to participate in the selection process from the start, then the
corporation would not compensate the shareholder for costs incurred
regardless of the outcome. This would encourage shareholders to take
advantage of the opportunity to have the board consider their
suggestions, and it would discourage shareholders waiting to see if they
are satisfied with the outcome before raising a complaint and becoming
involved in the process.
Additionally, the corporation will not compensate the board for
additional costs incurred in a proxy contest.295 Although directors are
“elected” to their positions, directorial elections are not elections in the
typical political sense.296 Standards of corporate governance should not
290. Upon receiving notice that an insurgent intended to launch a proxy contest, the
board must inform the shareholder of the baseline expenses for distribution in absence
of the threat of a proxy contest.
291. Because the anticipated expenses would be derived from those required to fund
an established system, the winner will be eligible for compensation at a rate exceeding
the baseline amount, pending evaluation of receipts that such increase was necessary.
292. The board would only distribute the background information of those
candidates included on the slate, so by giving the insurgent a copy of the Packet with
information on each candidate considered, the shareholder might be persuaded by the
additional information and decide not to pursue the contest.
293. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
294. Although nominations are anonymous, an eligible voter would have the same
voter ID for the duration of that year’s vote.
295. There are already safeguards that ensure that if insurgents sue directors,
directors would not suffer undue financial harm (e.g., indemnification and insurance
provisions). See supra Part I.C.2.
296. Some scholars emphasize the similarities between democratic political
elections and director elections. Harris, supra note 49, at 225 (“Corporate elections are
similar, in many ways, to political elections.”); Kang, supra note 60, at 1329 (likening
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validate, and they certainly should not facilitate, conduct that would turn
the process for selecting a fiduciary into a socio-political campaign.297
As such, if a director wants to launch a rebuttal to an insurgent’s contest
as an independent shareholder, the director may do so, provided he or
she does not use any company resources accessed by virtue of his or her
position on the board. 298 Further, if a director launches a rebuttal
campaign and wins, the director will only be compensated the amount of
the pre-determined baseline cost for proxy publication.299
d. Slate Ratification
The final change to the electoral process will occur at its final
stage - slate ratification.300 The new standard will abandon the current
default,301 which requires a plurality vote to ratify a proposed slate with
the option to require a majority vote and instead will require a majority
vote with the option of allowing a plurality to suffice. 302 Under the
majority vote standard, if an insufficient number of directors receive the

the way “shareholders respond to the informational signal from counter-endorsements
against management’s position by trusted sources” to voters in a political election).
However, director elections are more analogous to the appointment of trustees rather
than the appointment of a political official. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
297. Sharfman, supra note 59, at 412-13 (“[L]arge public companies are economic,
not political, institutions which first and foremost need to respond to the accountability
provided ‘by the market for stock (and the managers’ need to raise capital), the market
for goods, and the market for managers’ services.’“) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395, 397 (1983))
(footnote omitted).
298. See supra Part I.A.1.b.
299. Contra Murphy, supra note 26, at 137 (explaining that ordinarily, management
enjoys “virtually unlimited access to funds to promote its candidates while . . . other
shareholders [are afforded] only a ‘slim possibility of reimbursement if they should
triumph over shareholder inertia and concerted management opposition to win a seat on
the board’“).
300. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
301. Plurality voting is the traditional voting standard for director elections. Under
this standard, the directors who receive the most votes are elected to the board.
Velikonja, supra note 168, at 877 (explaining that under this default, because “[m]ost
directors run unopposed, so a director could be elected if she received a single vote in
her favor”).
302. See Sjostrom, supra note 55, at 217.
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majority vote to fill the board’s positions, a second vote will take
place.303
2. Board Composition
Boards must be able to operate with a measure of autonomy. 304
Fortunately, many shareholders do not want to be responsible for
monitoring directors, and the shareholders that do want to participate
actively in monitoring directors are not necessarily competent
monitors.305 Therefore, directors should only be those individuals who
are actually qualified to perform the requisite directorial duties. 306 In
order for the proposed changes to the director election process to have
optimal impact, directors must no longer be categorized as independent,
inside, or outside.307 Instead, board members should be assessed by their
potential to succeed as directors.308
303. The board will offer a new slate, half of which will include new nominees
selected pursuant to the new process, and half of which will include the highest-ranking
half of the directors on the original slate who did not receive a majority of the votes.
304. See supra Part II.A.
305. Specifically, if a shareholder desires to become more involved with the
management of the corporation, then that shareholder has other avenues by which he or
she might fulfill this wish—i.e., become a director. See J.W. Verret, Defending Against
Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s Future Reviewing Company Defenses in the
Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 398 (2011) (explaining that “rational apathy”
accounts for the fact that many shareholders neither vote, nor inform themselves about
the voting process because shareholders accurately anticipate “a low proportionate
benefit or their slim odds of affecting the outcome”); see also supra notes 15, 110-115
and accompanying text. Contra Insulating Boards, supra note 42, at 1643.
306. See, e.g., David A. Drexler et al., 1-13 Delaware Corporation Law and Practice
§ 13.01[12][b] (LexisNexis 2013) § 13.01[6] (clarifying that valid qualifications could
be general, like a maximum age, or they could be specific, like “a requirement of
American citizenship for directors of a corporation engaged in the defense industry”);
Corporate Laws Committee, ABA Section of Business Law, Changes in the Model
Business Corporation Act-Proposed Amendments to § 8.02 Relating to Qualifications
for Directors and Nominees for Directors, 68 BUS. LAW. 781, 783 (2013) (listing
eligibility requirements that would be permissible under § 8.02 including qualifications
“based on residence, shareholdings, age, length of service, experience, expertise and
professional licenses or certifications”).
307. See supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text; cf. Nicola Faith Sharpe,
Process Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach to Improving
Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 264 (2012) [hereinafter Process Over
Structure] (acknowledging that “[h]istory has shown that the scholarly and regulatory
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a. Who Can Be Nominated
Theoretically, any individual presented on the corporation’s
election slate may serve as a director upon shareholder ratification of the
slate; 309 however, because the shareholder vote is insignificant, the
Committee must be constrained by its ability to justify its basis for
selecting each nominee. 310 Current requirements focusing on the socalled “independent” status of a director are indeterminate. 311 Thus,
while the board must fully disclose to the shareholders any and all preexisting personal ties that a nominee has to the corporation, the
qualification inquiry must focus on a nominee’s objective potential to
fulfill directorial duties.312
focus on board composition and structure is a dangerously incomplete solution to the
problems that have caused this century’s corporate failures” and concluding that “how
boards engage in management monitoring should be the focus of corporate regulatory
reform, more so than who sits on the board or how boards are structured). Contra
Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73
(2007) (acknowledging that the ambiguity of an independent designation leads to
inconsistent rules, yet finding that the problem may be addressed by remaining
cognizant of the critical differences among non-management directors categorized as
independent, outside, or disinterested).
308. It is important to note that all corporations have different needs that would
benefit from different types of directors. Therefore, it is important to ascertain a
baseline requirement that is more stringent than that imposed under SOX and DoddFrank, but not too exacting. See, e.g., Marchesani, supra note 78, at 335 (“The
definition should require that a director be free from compromising ties and have the
motivation, skills, and other characteristics necessary for him to be effective.”).
309. Additional nominees may be included in the proxy material pursuant to a
successful proxy contest. See supra Part II.B.1.d. Specifically, any person permissibly
on the slate must have undergone the qualification assessment prior to the vote.
310. See supra Part II.B.2. Complying with these requirements would not require
exercise of business judgment, but instead would be reviewable under a reasonable
diligence standard. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (10th ed. 2014) (“A fair degree of
diligence expected from someone of ordinary prudence under circumstances like those
at issue.”).
311. See supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
312. Thus, individuals selected solely on the basis of their social status would not be
able to pre-qualify as candidates. The Packet would disclose any ties either to the
corporation or to other directors on the current and prospective board. Pertinent
personal ties include a financial stake or previous working relationship with any current
director or manager, prior involvement with other entities that provide similar services
as the corporation, or pre-existing social ties to majority shareholders, current directors,
or managers. See Marchesani, supra note 78, at 338 (“[R]elevant ties are not only those
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The board of directors of a publicly held corporation ideally
consists of individuals with experience in business management,
knowledge of the industry, competence in risk assessment, a propensity
for strategic planning, and most importantly, the ability to remain
objective. 313 Relevant considerations that would account for a
candidate’s eligibility might be any characteristic that manifested any of
these ideals.314 Each nominee must have relevant experience or a skill to
contribute that would lend itself to helping the board fulfill its duty to
oversee management of the corporation for shareholder wealth
maximization.315 Thus, the nominees included on the slate at the annual
director election must be objectively qualified to serve on the board and
satisfy objective thresholds predetermined in corporate instruments.316
b. Who Cannot Be Nominated
While there will be a comprehensive assessment of each nominee
for qualification to be elected, some factors will preclude those who
might otherwise qualify from being nominated. Relevant circumstances
with the company and its management, but also those with the other directors; any
significant relationship with any of these subjects might in fact have an improper
influence on an Independent member of the board.”).
313. Current federal regulations that impact board composition focus on the concept
of an “independent” director. This is problematic because the federal government’s
concept of independence conflates a relational connection with the ability to remain
objective. See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra note 198, at 1067-68 (“Federal intervention, by
enshrining the independent board for the public corporation has created an entity
suitable for but one purpose, dealing with managerial conflict.”); see also supra notes
195-207 and accompanying text.
314. See e.g., Marchesani, supra note 78, at 318 (emphasizing personal
characteristics of a potential director like “motivation, competence, and time
availability”).
315. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 18, at 1082-83 (describing the types
of qualities corporations look for in directors depending on the situation).
316. A prospective director does not need to embody all qualities, the individual just
must satisfy overall requirements. See Marchesani, supra note 78, at 338-39 (“A very
important concern is to identify directors who possess the necessary motivation to
discharge their duties effectively. . . . [Directors] should also meet a minimum level of
skills and industry-specific experience as well as devote sufficient time to their duties as
board members. While each director should also have specific additional knowledge,
such a requirement will vary depending on the competencies that the other directors
bring to the board[.]”).
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that might result in a candidate’s automatic disqualification include an
insurmountable conflict of interest or anything that would prevent an
individual from maintaining an objective perspective when fulfilling the
expected directorial duties.317
The Committee will determine whether a nominee possesses these
disqualifying characteristics before the Meeting, and the Committee
representative will confirm such a finding before the presentation of the
final slate to the shareholders. This ensures that candidates are not
improperly excluded and that candidates nominated via write-in do not
violate this requirement.318
A corporation’s CEO will not be allowed to sit on its board of
directors concurrently.319 Excluding CEOs from board service will allow
directors to evaluate the CEO without fear of retribution.320 Further, the
317. Examples of people who might not be suitable to serve on a board due to
insurmountable conflicts of interest are CEOs of other companies, officers of the
corporation, and “special interest” directors. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note
18, at 1114 (“[I]nstitutional investors occasionally nominate board members in order to
influence governance of a particular firm.”).
318. Besides through the official selection process, candidates may appear on the
slate as the result of a proxy contest. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
319. This does not preclude every member of the corporation’s top management
from being elected to serve as a director. Because there is no statutory requirement for
management positions, a corporation might hire an individual to manage an aspect of
the corporation that would present a conflict of interest to the same extent as a CEO.
For example, a corporation might want someone serving as the Chief Legal Officer (the
“CLO”) or Chief Financial Officer (the “CFO”) concurrently to serve on the board.
Although the interests of the CLO and CFO might diverge differently from those of
directors who, independent from board participation, do not have the authority to
participate directly in the day-to-day management of the corporation, their involvement
does not pose the same threat as the CEO’s. Nor does this preclude anyone who is a
CEO from serving as a director on the board of another corporation. Contra Rodrigues,
supra note 198, at 1055 (advocating for the disqualification of “full-time employees
from board membership altogether, thus relegating CEOs to an observer status that
permits them to attend most meetings but not to vote”). This is distinguishable from
current requirements under the NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards that independent
directors meet separate from management—and the rest of the board—periodically. See
NYSE Manual, supra note 77, at § 303A.03; NASDAQ Marketplace Rule 4350(c),
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/nasdaqllcf1a4_5/nasdaqllcamend
rules4000.pdf.
320. Harley E. Ryan Jr. & Roy A. Wiggins III, Who Is in Whose Pocket? Director
Compensation, Board Independence, and Barriers to Effective Monitoring, 73 J. FIN.
ECON. 497, 509 (2004) (explaining that as CEO’s power increases, the CEO will use
this power for personal gain).
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board may still consult with the CEO and allow the CEO’s
recommendations to influence its decisions. However, without the
CEO’s direct involvement, the board may more freely decide to act
either without conferring with the CEO or contrary to the CEO’s
suggestion.321
Although the CEO will not sit on the board, directors will obtain
information about the company from monthly reports and by meeting
either with the CEO or the CEO’s designated liaison.322 Specifically, as
a result of the exclusion of CEOs from board service, corporations will
need to include in their articles of incorporation or bylaws a requirement
for the CEO to report the status of the corporation to the board, such as
requiring the CEO to attend the monthly board meeting.323 Corporations
may amend their bylaws to broaden CEO involvement, but these
amendments may not allow the CEO to vote on issues before the
board. 324 Additionally, the directors must ensure that the CEO is not
apprised of the voting process beyond the end result.325 Thus, while the
Committee might consider the CEO’s suggested candidates for
nomination more exhaustively, the CEO will neither take part in any
official Committee deliberation nor know who served on the Committee
and what transpired during a Meeting until the board presents the final
slate to the shareholders.326

321. Murphy, supra note 26, at 181 (“A line of business administration scholars
have long regarded the CEO’s power to nominate or influence the nomination of
directors as an important source of the CEO’s power on the board.”).
322. Karmel, supra note 131, at 790 (“Independent directors are completely
beholden to management for information. This dependence on insiders may give a CEO
more power than was the case when a board included insiders.”).
323. Further, the corporation’s bylaws might require each manager personally to
submit a monthly report to the board to ensure the board makes fully informed
decisions. See generally Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New
Learning, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2011) (“Outside directors will always suffer
informational disadvantages relative to insiders, and this disadvantage will be greater in
firms where outsiders have greater difficulty acquiring information about the firm.”).
324. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
325. This will ensure the directors are not unduly influenced by the CEO, whom
they share a reciprocal desire to maintain the status quo. Dent, supra note 49, at 1248
(“Boards strive to entrench themselves and the CEO.”).
326. This would discourage campaigning. See supra note 296 and accompanying
text, for a discussion of how director elections are not political elections.
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3. Reconceptualizing Shareholder Rights, and the Question of Director
Removal
The proposed reforms define the ways in which shareholders must
be allowed to participate in the election of directors. 327 Allowing
shareholders to participate in a meaningful way limited to the director
election process would inspire confidence in their boards’ ability to
carry out their primary purpose without compromising the shareholders’
reliance on the expectation that they have entrusted their investment to a
qualified fiduciary.328
The people investing in the stock of a corporation do not
necessarily know about the specific laws for the different states in which
the corporation is incorporated. 329 Although people ideally should
investigate what they spend their money on before investing, in reality,
when people take the time to research potential investments, they are
more concerned with the mission and reputation of a corporation than
with the state laws that might distinguish it from a similarly situated
company.330
Furthermore, when people decide to invest, they generally consider
the reputation of the corporation, the expected financial return, and other
subjective factors. 331 Ultimately, if they choose to become a passive
investor in a corporation, they entrust the management of their
investment to sophisticated people that are qualified to run the

327.
328.

See supra Part II.B.1-2.
See supra notes 15, 110-115, 244-247 and accompanying text, for a discussion
of the reasons for limiting shareholder involvement beyond this level. Cf. Velikonja,
supra note 168, at 877 (“Shareholders express their preferences in two other ways: by
casting votes in director elections and by influencing nominating committees that select
board nominees.”).
329. Bainbridge, supra note 62, at 623 (2006) (“[S]hareholders lack incentives to
gather the information necessary to actively participate in decisionmaking. . . . Given
the length and complexity of corporate disclosure documents, the opportunity cost
entailed in making informed decisions is both high and apparent.”).
330. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
331. Jacob E. Hasler, Contracting For Good: How Benefit Corporations Empower
Investors and Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1322 (2014)
(explaining that “shareholders are presumed to exchange capital for a promise that
directors will maximize the value of their investment[;]” however, “an interest among
certain shareholders to invest in publicly traded companies that further social missions
exists”); see supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
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business.332 Moreover, they do not invest in a publicly held corporation
because they desire to collaborate with all of the other shareholders.333
Unless a company’s mission statement provided to the contrary, people
who decide to invest do so without the expectation that any person, by
virtue of his or her ownership or interest in a share of the corporation,
will be able to make decisions that impact their financial returns.334 The
only qualification for purchasing a share of a corporation on a publicly
listed stock exchange is the ability to pay for the stock.335 It follows that
strangers who similarly invest in a corporation do not expect them to
have decision-making authority over the corporation.336
The new electoral process will guarantee shareholders the
opportunity to make their preferences known and to meaningfully
participate in the election of directors on two occasions.337 First, they
can have their election suggestions considered without having to mount
a proxy contest. 338 Second, they will have a fair chance to launch a
proxy contest during which they can present to the rest of the
332. Bernard S. Sharfman, What’s Wrong With Shareholder Empowerment?, 37 J.
CORP. L. 903, 906-07 (2012) [hereinafter What’s Wrong] (articulating the “disparities
between management and shareholders in terms of information, skill in decision
making, and interests” and concluding “that the private ordering of corporate
governance arrangements, where decision making is shifted from the board and its
executive officers to shareholders, should be a rare occurrence, and moreover, should
be presumed harmful to corporate governance unless proven otherwise”).
333. Sharfman, supra note 59, at 405 (acknowledging “most shareholders’ natural
lack of interest in the corporate governance of those many companies they invest in”).
334. See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 759 (2005) (describing the “collection action
problems” that prevent shareholders “from becoming informed or acting based on
social and moral sanctions”).
335. See generally Market Centers: Buying and Selling Stock, U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/market.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2015) (listing the process involved in executing a trade to buy or sell stock).
336. What’s Wrong, supra note 332, at 905 (rejecting arguments for shareholder
empowerment in publicly held corporations and explaining that “it is imperative that
the board and its executive officers have the authority to make the vast majority of
decisions or delegate decision-making authority without shareholder approval. Such a
shareholder approval process would simply freeze up the corporation and ultimately
lead to its failure”). Contra. Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 16, at 868
(advocating for shareholder power to initiate structural changes).
337. See supra Part II.B.1.c.
338. See id.
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corporation’s shareholders their nominees and the background
information on which the board based its decision if the board did not
include the shareholder’s nomination on the final slate.339 Additionally,
shareholders will be able to make more informed decisions concerning
how they will vote on a slate because they will have access to
comprehensive background material about each nominee.340
Implementing procedural safeguards to prevent boards’ complete
control over the election process will allow shareholders to be more
confident in the ability of their boards to effectuate their primary
purpose;341 however, the SEC’s regulations should not extend beyond
this procedural check.342 This is because once a board is elected, it must
be able to do its job.343 Thus, requiring boards not only to adhere to a
prescriptive process designed to ensure transparency in the selection
process, but also to conduct yearly evaluations of incumbent directors,
will mitigate factors that compromise the ability of boards to remain
objective without infringing on the freedom of corporations.344
Accordingly, while it is clear that reducing board insularity would
increase director accountability, the manner by which boards are
formally constrained must be narrowly tailored to address the disparity
between corporate governance practices that favor incentivizing
individuals to serve as directors over preserving the cardinal purpose of
the board.345 Curtailing board insularity to incentivize directors “to avoid
shirking, empire building, and other departures from shareholder
interests that are costly” by expressly encouraging shareholder
engagement and facilitating activist intervention would not only increase
the vulnerability of directors to opportunistic, collusive, and paternalistic
influences, but also obstruct the transparency afforded by the knowledge
of exactly who is involved in determining company policy and

339.
340.

See id.
Compare disclosure requirements under the stock exchanges, supra note 202,
with Part II.B.
341. See supra Introduction, Section B.
342. Contra Fisch, supra note 265, at 495.
343. See supra Part I.B; see generally Managing Expectations, supra note 147, at
448 (questioning “whether the oversight doctrine offers false hope, creating
expectations that directors cannot realistically fulfill”).
344. E.g., Sharfman, supra note 59, at 398 (“[A] one-size-fits-all approach to
corporate governance is much reviled.”); see also supra Part II.B.1.a.
345. See supra Introduction, Section B.
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overseeing the management of the corporation. 346 Therefore,
modifications to the election process will increase the likelihood that
only trustworthy and competent individuals will be elected and that
incumbent directors are actually vulnerable to replacement.
Although shareholders are traditionally conceived of as having the
right to evaluate directors and convey their assessments through their
involvement at shareholder meetings and decisions in annual elections,
these rights are widely recognized as nominal.347 Campaigns promoting
shareholder empowerment ensued; however, particularly in light of the
current economic climate, adopting a governance structure that would
allow shareholders to overtake the fundamental responsibilities of the
board would destabilize corporate America further.348
Instead, granting shareholders the right to participate in the
nomination and election process without increasing their ability to
remove directors would not only incentivize directors and shareholders
to take the nomination and selection process seriously because each
elected director would serve at least an entire term, but also allow
directors to exercise their business judgment free from outside

346. In The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, Professor
Bebchuk argues that the ability of shareholders to intervene and engage with companies
would, in the long-term, benefit not only companies but also shareholders and the
general economy. See Insulating Boards, supra note 42, at 1643-44 (conceding that he
neither argues nor believes “the optimal level of board insulation is zero”).
Nevertheless, this conclusion is only speculative, because modern boards of publicly
held corporations remain very insulated. Bebchuk implores policymakers and
institutional investors to “going forward, reject the arguments for limiting the rights and
involvement of shareholders that are regularly made in the name of long-term value.”
Insulating Boards, supra note 42, at 1687. Contra William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 661-62
(2010) (rejecting the reasoning that justifies support for policies increasing shareholder
power and regulatory reform on the basis that the failure of the management of
corporations to assess risk is what lead to the current financial crisis).
347. See supra Introduction, Section C.
348. Compare Insulating Boards, supra note 42, with Bainbridge & Henderson,
supra note 18. See also Cohen & Schleyer, supra note 90, at 106 (explaining that
shareholder proposals seeking to have their rights increased “have been common in
recent years and a number of public companies have reacted by providing shareholders
with these rights (subject to limitations), although concerns about their potential impact
as a takeover mechanism have limited their appeal to many companies and shareholder
groups”).
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pressure.349 So long as the director fulfills his or her directorial duties,
working to maximize shareholder wealth, the director’s position would
be secure for at least a year.350 Thus, although it would remain difficult
to remove a director in between elections, boards would no longer be
completely unrestrained self-perpetuating entities.351
III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS (AND WHY THEY FAIL)
Part III of this Note explains why existing proposals to reform
regulation of boards fail. The responsibilities of the modern corporate
board far exceed fulfillment of its primary purpose.352 Furthermore, the
continual imposition of additional obligations understandably tends to
distract boards from achieving their intended goal. 353 Specifically, the
349.
350.

See supra Part I.B.
See generally Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
187, 224-48 (1991) [hereinafter Quinquennial Election] (describing how insulating
directors from short-term pressures will ultimately allow them to fulfill their
responsibility and best serve the long-term interests of the corporation and explaining
an ideal model would insulate directors and managers “for substantial enough periods
to permit them to develop their future plans, while at the same time creating a periodic
forum in which the directors would be totally uninsulated and subject to recall by the
stockholders”).
351. See supra Part I.A.
352. Cf. Rodrigues, supra note 198, at 1053 (articulating that, “we ask public
company boards to do too much with too little . . . [:] the dominant regulatory
philosophy pushes corporations towards the unattainable Platonic Ideal and then takes
boards to task when they fall short”). State corporate statutes are generally unrestrictive
and afford investors considerable flexibility in determining the structure of their
corporations. In fact, although there is a recognized “Platonic Ideal board,” comprised
of directors who are intelligent, active, and engaged, there are no legal requirements
that specify qualitative characteristics of directors. See Rodrigues, supra note 198, at
1087, 1087 n.179; see also Velikonja, supra note 168, at 903 (explaining that the
concept of board independence has different meanings for different people, and
independent directors are generally conceptualized as people without ties to the
corporation or management who are “superior to all other dependent groups with clear
interests: managers, shareholders, employees, public interest groups, and creditors”). In
fact, the only substantive positive requirement of a board is to have a director on the
audit committee who is a financial expert. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §
7265. But see id. (providing for disclosure “whether or not, and if not, the reasons
therefor, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least [one] member who
is a financial expert”) (emphasis added).
353. See supra Part I.C.2.
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traditional duties of the board are generally default rules derived from
state statutes, and directors are afforded broad discretion under state law
to tailor the way by carry out their responsibilities.354
When the federal government directs how all boards must operate
when overseeing the management of the corporation, it not only fails to
achieve its intended goal through its ambiguous instructions,355 but also
imposes universal reforms, the application of which may unnecessarily
disrupt the structure of a successfully functioning corporation.356
The balance of a well-structured company is disturbed by mandates
to alter the way in which the board carries out its duties because whereas
a board’s failure to comply with a mandatory rule risks intervention by
the federal government, it is difficult to prove that a board failed to
comply with its duties imposed under state law.357 Some of the formerly
discretionary duties of the board become mandatory due to federal
intervention; as such, the importance of the fulfillment of their duties
overtakes the boards’ attention to obligations subject to state law
because only this regulated activity may be monitored effectively. 358
This created a false perception of increased transparency and
accountability because the boards’ responsibilities in overseeing the
corporation’s compliance with new federal regulations are more readily

354. See supra notes 216-221 and accompanying text; see also Rodrigues, supra
note 198, at 1054 (“State corporate law by its nature necessitates such flexibility, given
the fact that the same basic corporate code serves the needs of both tiny ‘mom and pop’
corporations and Fortune 50 behemoths.”).
355. See supra Part I.C.2.b.ii.
356. See supra notes 6, 191 and accompanying text, for a discussion of how the
federal government generally enacts legislation in response to isolated incidents. Cf.
Process Over Structure, supra note 307, at 311 (concluding that “[c]urrent attempts to
fix corporate boards are doomed to failure”).
357. See supra Part I.C.2.
358. For example, while the board is tasked with overseeing the management of the
corporation on behalf of the shareholders, independent directors, who arguably should
not have any specific duties derived from their position besides working to carry out the
board’s duties, have been tasked “to oversee compliance with legal and regulatory
requirements and catch wrongdoing, to evaluate an auditor’s conflicts of interest and
supervise its work, to set the standards of social responsibility of the company, and
monitor performance and compliance with those standards.” Velikonja, supra note 168,
at 905.
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traceable.359 Consequently, confusion arose over the primary purpose of
the board and resulted in a primacy debate over what policies corporate
governance should promote to ensure the board’s ultimate purpose is
achieved.360
Conclusions conceived of through the prism of the authors’
subjective beliefs of the purpose of the board inspire ideological debates
that polarize proponents of conflicting viewpoints in a primacy
debate; 361 their proposed reforms are all aimed toward resolving a
different issue.362 Thus, rather than having any actual effect on corporate
governance, solutions proposed by proponents arguing within their
359. See supra notes 244-247 and accompanying text; see also Fisch & Gentile,
supra note 29, at 541 (recognizing the costs of creating and maintaining committees on
how the board functions overall and explaining that “[i]ssuers have long expressed
concern that, as the burdens associated with being a director increase, their success in
attracting and retaining qualified directors decreases”).
360. See Micro-Symposium on Competing Theories of Corporate Governance, 62
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 66 (2014) for a discussion of the competing theories of
corporate governance that form the primacy debate; see also Sprague & Lyttle, supra
note 8 (shareholder primacy); Director Primacy, supra note 101 (director primacy);
Blair & Stout, supra note 34 (team production); Georgiev, supra note 239, at 71-78
(2014) (investor primacy); Rodrigues, supra note 198 (conflict primacy); Quinquennial
Election, supra note 350 (quinquennial election model); A Critical Look, supra note
100 (self-perpetuating board theory).
361. Andrew Ross Sorkin, An Unusual Boardroom Battle, in Academia, DEALBOOK
(Jan. 5, 2015, 9:42 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/05/an-unusualboardroom-battle-in-academia/?_r=0 (illuminating the eruption of “a nasty, often
personal battle among elite professors, regulators and white-shoe lawyers” regarding
proponents of different - apparently adversarial - opinions on the effectiveness of
classified boards and the appropriateness of the publications of the opposing viewholder with regard to the dispute).
362. See, e.g., Fogel & Geier, supra note 8, at 66-68 (proposing reforms that would
position “oversight shareholders” on corporate boards to situate shareholders in their
rightful position as “[t]he most effective check and balance on management”); Howard,
supra note 125, at 426 (proposing “regulations that would insulate corporate directors’
informal decisionmaking processes from being hindered by groupthink”); see
Rodrigues, supra note 198, at 1052-53 (articulating the “Platonic Ideal” model of the
corporate board and explaining how reform efforts for the past thirty years have focused
on achieving that goal); Velikonja, supra note 168, at 904 (“Independent directors are
viewed differently by various constituencies: investors view them as advocates for
shareholder wealth maximization; employees view them as advocates for institutional
stability; financial creditors view them as a voice of reason against excessive risktaking; environmentalists view them as stewards of our environment; and still other
interests view them as representatives of the public interest.”).
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respective primacy frameworks are largely discounted. 363 In fact, the
proponents of different viewpoints often concede that their proposed
solutions are impractical, 364 incomplete, 365 unrealistic, 366 or
unworkable.367 Others propose changes that would only further distract
363. See, e.g., Director Primacy, supra note 101, at 597-98 (describing Professors
Blair’s and Stout’s mediating hierarch theory of boards as inapplicable to established
publicly held corporations or alternatively “inapt”); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in
the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 536 (2006)
(identifying the first of the Article’s two principal aims as arguing “that Blair, Stout,
and [Einer] Elhauge do not succeed in demonstrating the superiority of their alternative
approaches from an efficiency perspective”); Stout, supra note 100, at 791, 808
(explaining that “calls for greater ‘shareholder democracy’ appeal to laymen, the
business media, and even many business experts not because they are based on
evidence, but because they have a strong emotional allure[,]” and cautioning that
without empirical evidence to support this conclusion, it would be reckless to accept the
argument “that giving shareholders greater control over corporate directors would be a
good idea”). But see Grant, supra note 120, at 764-65 (purporting to “contribute[] to the
existing scholarly literature by developing and modernizing reforms that practitioners
considered in connection with Sarbanes-Oxley . . . [and] Dodd-Frank”).
364. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 120, at 799, 807 (confoundingly “[s]etting practical
concerns aside” by contradicting her earlier recognition that nominal independence fails
to account for organizational behaviors that can perpetuate conflicts of interests that
arise from having “captured boards” before offering what Professor Bernice Grant
ultimately designates a “creative yet practical approach to indirectly achieve the goal of
enhancing the independent judgment of the compensation committee members”)
(emphasis added).
365. Allan C. Hutchinson, Hurly-Berle–Corporate Governance, Commercial
Profits, and Democratic Deficits, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1219, 1219, 1249 (2011)
(rejecting the shareholder primacy norm and “the traditional evaluative focus of
economic success” in favor of “a more inclusive and democratic standard of social
well-being” but leaving unanswered the questions of how to “determin[e] for the
purposes of corporate governance which groups are to classify as members, by what
means their interests are to be ascertained, how to ensure that those interests are
adequately represented, and on what basis those often competing interests are to be
weighed and balanced”).
366. Simultaneously criticizing the expectations of the federal government and
corporate reformers for their “unrealistic” expectations for the board, Professor Usha
Rodrigues prefaces her proposal for a “fully independent board” to “reconstitut[e] and
refram[e] the board of directors” by stating that she is “skeptical that we can define our
way to ‘true’ independence[.]” Rodrigues, supra note 198, at 1053, 1055.
367. See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra note 198, at 1089 (describing her solution “in
general terms” but “deferring the implementation question for another day[.]”); Sprague
& Lyttle, supra note 8, at 41-42 (opening Article by describing how the current
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boards from fulfilling their primary purpose.368
Although the primacy debate expressly deals with board function,
not insularity, the proposed changes to the board ultimately speak to the
problems exacerbated by unrestrained board insularity.369 The proposed
methods fail because the constituents of the debate disagree at a

financial crisis supports the conclusion that corporate governance needs to be reformed,
but conceding that the it is doubtful that their proposed solution will on its own prevent
the next financial crisis).
368. For example, in Groupthink and Corporate Governance Reform: Changing the
Formal and Informal Decisionmaking Process of Corporate Boards, Andrew Howard
suggests that corporate boards should allow proxy access not only to institutional
investors but also to creditors. Howard, supra note 125, at 452-53. Howard explains
that this reform would facilitate competitive elections by reducing the cost of running a
proxy contest. Although Howard offers restrictions, such as requiring a 5% ownership
share for at least two years and limiting the number of nominations accepted from
institutional investors and creditors to no more than one-quarter of the board, this
reform fails for two reasons. First, this reform would permit institutional investors and
creditors “the right to nominate directors straight onto the corporation’s proxy statement
for an annual or special shareholders’ meeting” without restricting the pool of
candidates for nomination. Id. at 452. Second, the extension of electoral voting rights to
any institutional investor but not all shareholders creates an even greater risk of
clashing interests where the interests of a sophisticated organized constituency will be
pursued at the expense of an individual shareholder seeking to profit from a long-term
investment. Similarly, while creditors have an interest in the survival of the corporation,
their interest in the corporation’s profitability will never exceed the amount of debt
owed. See Velikonja, supra note 168, at 860-61 (arguing that “[i]nstitutional investors
and corporate managers value director independence because it displaces more
meaningful reform . . . that might limit rent-seeking or force firms to internalize fully
the costs of their activities,” and that “ excessively risky strategies transfer wealth to
shareholders at the expense of creditors and employees”); see also Bainbridge &
Henderson, supra note 18, at 1068, 1081-82 (suggesting corporations provide
compensation incentives to professional directors to align their interests with the
shareholders and to change the legal requirement of a board being comprised of
“natural persons,” but failing to acknowledge the issue of unconstrained board activity
and the extent to which directors are able to bond together and act without any
meaningful oversight, insulated from the threat of any personal liability); Samuel R.
Foreman, Bored Boards: The Directorial Disengagement Dilemma, 50 WASHBURN L.J.
147 (2010) (advocating for professional directors).
369. Rodrigues, supra note 198, at 1055 (identifying an issue posed by a
“disconnect between the theoretical power and actual impotence of the public board”).
Contra A Critical Look, supra note 100, at 1272 (arguing that the board “with certain
limitations” should be made “a de jure self-perpetuating body”).
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fundamental level.370 For example, contrary to the history of corporate
governance and the stated purpose of the public corporation, 371 some
scholars are convinced that shareholders should control the corporation
or that the primary purpose of the board is not to maximize shareholder
profit.372
Recently, the SEC announced its decision to review Rule 14a8(i)(9) and declared that for the 2015 proxy season, it would not issue
any rulings on shareholder proposals excluded under this section of the
Rule. 373 Rule 14a-8(i) addresses when a corporation may exclude a
shareholder proposal from its proxy statements despite the shareholder’s
compliance with the procedural requirements for director elections and
370. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Stephen Bainbridge, proponents of shareholder
primacy and director primacy, respectively, agree the ultimate purpose of the board is to
work to maximize shareholder wealth; however, while Bebchuk lobbies for shareholder
empowerment and director accountability to shareholders, who Bebchuk believes
ultimately control the corporation, Bainbridge asserts that “[s]trong limits on
shareholder control . . . essential.” Micro-Symposium on Competing Theories of
Corporate Governance, supra note 360, at 70 (emphasis added). But see Hutchinson,
supra note 365, at 1250 (avoiding adopting any particular theory within the primacy
debate (although explicitly rejecting the shareholder primacy norm) and instead
advocating for a more democratic approach by focusing on “limits on limited liability; a
broadening of directors’ fiduciary duties; the increased representativeness of the board;
and the enactment of substantive regulatory standard”).
371. See supra Introduction, Section A.
372. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 34, at 282-83 (conceiving of the public
corporation as a “mediating hierarchy,” where this is board primacy, but directors as
disinterested trustees, representing the interests of all, not just the shareholders);
Elhauge supra note 334, at 733, 738 (explaining that despite the canonical law and
economics view of the duty to maximize profits for shareholders, “[c]orporate
managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate profits.
Rather, they have always had some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice
corporate profits in the public interest”); Sydney Ember, Morning Agenda: Seeking
More Say on Directors, DEALBOOK (Nov. 6, 2014, 7:26AM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2014/11/06/morning-agenda-seeking-more-say-on-directors/ (describing
efforts of a group of institutional shareholders, led by New York City Comptroller Scott
M. Stringer to increase boardroom accountability by submitting proxy proposals to
public corporations “to allow investors to hire and fire directors directly”) (emphasis
added).
373. Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Reversal May Clear Way for Shareholders to
Challenge Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2015),www.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/
business/sec-reversal-may-clear-way-for-shareholders-to-challengecompanies.html?_r=0.
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provides a succession of thirteen circumstances under which a
corporation may justify its decision to exclude a shareholder proposal.374
A corporation may invoke the ninth substantive basis for excluding an
otherwise legitimate shareholder proposal from a its proxy statement
based on the content of the shareholder proposal if points of “the
proposal directly conflict[] with one of the company’s own proposals to
be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.”375 However, as of
January 16, Rule 14a-8(i)(9) has been suspended.376
On December 1, 2014, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance
(the “Division”) approved Whole Foods Market, Inc.’s decision to
exclude a shareholder proposal that would have permitted shareholders
who owned at least 3% of the common stock for three years to nominate
directors.377 Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(9), Whole Foods had filed a noaction letter with the SEC justifying exclusion of the proposal “because
the Proponent’s Proposal directly conflicts with a proposal to be
submitted by the Company in the 2015 Proxy Materials[.]” 378 The
shareholder, James McRitchie, submitted two letters on December 23
and 30 appealing the SEC’s decision and requesting that it either
reconsider or review its decision on the basis that (1) Whole Foods did
not appear to have legitimately planned to submit its own proposal
directly in conflict with the shareholder’s, (2) this obfuscated the
purpose of the rule, which “was not intended to allow companies to
simply avoid shareholder proposals by substituting their own proposal
on the same subject[,]” and (3) including the shareholder’s proposal as
well as Whole Foods’ alleged proposal “would not lead to inconsistent
and ambiguous results[.]”379 On January 16, the SEC notified McRitchie
that upon further consideration, Chair Mary Jo White directed the
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(9) (2011).
Morgenson, supra note 373.
Id.
James McRitchie, Appeal of No-Action on Proxy Access at Whole Foods
Markets, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 13, 2015, 9:11 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2015/01/13/appeal-of-no-action-on-proxy-accessat-whole-foods-markets/.
379. Id.; see Andrew Ackerman & Joann S. Lublin, Whole Foods Dispute Prompts
SEC Review of Corporate Ballots, WSJ (Jan. 19, 2015), www.wsj.com/articles/inreversal-sec-wont-allow-whole-foods-to-exclude-nonbinding-shareholder-proposal1421450999 (“The SEC’s December decision allowing Whole Foods to ignore the
shareholder proposal prompted more than 20 companies to seek permission to exclude
similar corporate governance proposals.”).
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Division to review the basis for exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(9), and
accordingly, “[t]he Division would not express any views under [that]
rule . . . for the current proxy season.”380 And thus, the Division reversed
its no-action order because in light of its decision not to express views
on this type of exclusion, it could not express a view concerning Whole
Foods’ decision to exclude the proposal here.381
Reactions to the decision to suspend Rule 14a-8(i)(9) for the year
have been mixed.382 Proponents of shareholder proxy access have called
for shareholders to unite against the potential for boards to abuse the
knowledge that enforcement action for exclusion of proposals on the
basis of “conflicting” content is unlikely. 383 For example, McRitchie
published an article advising shareholders to adopt a no-tolerance policy
against decisions to exclude proposals based on Rule 14a-8(i)(9) until
the review is completed. 384 Conversely, Whole Foods has not
commented on the decision beyond confirming that it is reviewing the
SEC’s statement. 385 Likewise, the opposition to increased shareholder
proxy access has implored proxy adviser firms and institutional
investors to refrain from commenting on the issue until the SEC makes

380. Letter from David R. Fredrickson, Chief Counsel, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, to James McRitchie (Jan. 16, 2015) (http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2015/jamesmcritchiecheveddenrecon01161514a8.pdf). For official statement, see Public Statement from Chair Mary Jo White
Directing Staff to Review Commission Rule for Excluding Conflicting Proxy Proposals
(Jan. 16, 2015) (http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-conflicting-proxyproposals.html#.VNP2vZ3F81I).
381. Id.
382. See R. Douglas Harmon, SEC Reverses Course on Proxy Exclusions for
Certain Shareholder Proposals, JDSUPRA (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/sec-reverses-course-on-proxy-exclusions-49528/ (discussing possible shortterm and long-term significance of the Division’s official review of the Rule).
383. James McRitchie, SEC Withdraws No-Action: Rule 14a-8(i)(9), CORPGOV.NET
(Jan. 19, 2015), http://corpgov.net/2015/01/sec-withdraws-no-action-from-whole-foodsrule-14a-8i9-suspended/ (“[I]f they omit a duly submitted proxy proposal based on their
own interpretation of the subdivision now under review by the SEC, their directors
should face a vote of no confidence.”).
384. See id.
385. Ross Kerber & Tanvi Mehta, SEC steps back after challenge on Whole Foods
proxy access, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2015), www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/20/wholefoods-mrkt-sec-idUSL1N0UZ0PS20150120.
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its final determination.386 Ultimately, whatever the SEC announces to be
the proper scope and application of this Rule has the potential to result
in an increase in litigation.387
In light of the failure of the existing federal regulations and
proposed solutions to resolve the ambiguity of the purpose and
responsibilities of the board, it is important to shift away from the
“primacy” debate. 388 Instead, corporate reformers should focus on
determining what checks and balances are necessary to ensure that
boards fulfill their duties without continual interruption, but with a more
legitimate incentive to concentrate interests.389
CONCLUSION
Stringent laws or policies that would heavily monitor boards would
discourage anyone from wanting to serve on them. 390 Although the
primary purpose of the board is to oversee the management of the
corporation for shareholder wealth maximization, modern legal,
386. Dow Jones Business News, Proxy Adviser Warns Companies on Shareholder
Ballots, NASDAQ (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/proxy-adviserwarns-companies-on-shareholder-ballots-20150123-00677 (“Business groups like the
Business Roundtable had urged proxy advisers firms to stay out of the fight while the
Securities and Exchange Commission reviews its rules.”).
387. See Broc Romanek, Proxy Access Punt: Top 5 Things People Are Asking,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (Jan. 19, 2015), www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/
2015/01/proxy-access-punt-top-5-things-people-are-asking.html (listing five options
and their potential consequences for corporation’s that have counterproposals in
conflict with a shareholder proposal and noting the potential reach of the SEC’s new
position beyond proxy access proposals); see also Marianne Hill, Taming the Corporate
Beast, DOLLARS&SENSE (July/August 2014), www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/
2014/0714hill.html (recalling the litigation resulting from the SEC’s attempt to
implement a Rule “facilitating shareholders’ ability to have their proposed nominees for
a corporation’s board of directors included in proxy materials”); supra note 200, for a
discussion of the SEC’s failed attempt to ensure shareholder proxy access through Rule
14a-11.
388. E.g., Hutchinson, supra note 365, at 1245, 1249 (adopting a democratic view of
corporate governance similar to Blair and Stouts’ team production theory whereby
“profit maximization . . . will simply no longer be the exclusive or predominant goal
among many other social ambitions” and shareholders “would become simply different
kinds of members who would include owners, directors, managers, workers, customers,
suppliers, lenders, neighbors, community, etc.”).
389. See supra Parts I.C.2 and II.B.
390. See supra Part II.A.
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economic, and political policies have both expressly and implicitly
imposed upon boards additional responsibilities they were not
traditionally expected to undertake. 391 Given the nature of a publicly
held corporation and the passive role of shareholders, there needs to be
some federal regulations that require boards to take affirmative
measures to remain objective when acting in their role as part of the
fiduciary of the shares of the corporation.392
Further, directors are necessarily concerned with their corporation
operating within the law because being found to have violated the law
would harm stock value.393 Nevertheless, an affirmative duty to monitor
the corporation’s compliance with regulations, absent a similar
expressly imposed obligation to ensure boards fulfill their
responsibilities in light of their primary duty, might tacitly encourage
boards to shift their focus from shareholder wealth maximization to
general oversight for compliance. 394 Because the regulations establish
clear expectations of corporations, the board can and probably should
create a separate corporate group of qualified individuals to work in

391. See supra notes 237, 358 and accompanying text; Rodrigues, supra note 198, at
1052 (“With every financial crisis or scandal comes the cry ‘Where were the boards?’
and a call for boards to ‘do more’“).
392. See supra Part II.B.
393. See supra Introduction, and Part I.C.1, for descriptions of the social network of
boards and directors’ diverging interests; Scarlett, supra note 110, at 46 (suggesting that
“market forces [may] curb decision-maker discretion and encourage voluntary
information disclosure on actions and related outcomes”).
394. For example, under § 205 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which is entitled
“Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer,” the board of directors may create a
qualified legal compliance committee, comprised of at least one member of the audit
committee and at least two other independent directors, responsible for addressing
reports of any possible material violation “by the issuer or by any officer, director,
employee, or agent of the issuer[.]” 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.2(k), 205.3(c)(1) (2014). Cf.
Velikonja, supra note 168, at 909 (explaining how in response to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, the NYSE “required listed companies to maintain a fully
independent audit committee to implement and oversee internal control systems”
without “articulating clearly ‘for whose benefit [internal controls’ exists, and to what
end’“ and arguing that, in fact, “[u]sing the corporate board of directors to police
corruption and bribery is curious because bribe-paying harms a firm’s competitors, not
investors”). See supra Part I.C.2.b.
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conjunction with management to whom the board could delegate the
responsibility to oversee the corporation’s compliance.395
Eliminating designations such as “independent,” “outside,” or
“inside,” in favor of focusing on an individual’s overall traits, which
would, in their totality, qualify a person to serve on a board, will
eliminate concerns of absolute unconstrained director control and
instead contribute to the management and oversight of the corporation
for shareholder wealth maximization.396 And thus, it is essential to shift
away from an assessment that focuses on a single characteristic of a
candidate at the time of election.397

395. However, this separate group will be distinct from the board. The board’s duty,
first and foremost, will be to oversee the management of the corporation to maximize
the value of the common stock. The group will be another component of the corporate
operations that the board oversees, but it will not be another committee or subsidiary of
the board. Contra Murphy, supra note 26, at 189 (proposing for a dual-purpose board).
396. See supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
397. But see supra Part II.B.2.b, for a discussion of some singular disqualifying
characteristics.

